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Summary 
In this thesis, I use a political economy of trade policy approach to analyze 
the issues of strategic lobbying and taxation choice. The thesis contains 4 
papers together with an introduction, literature review and conclusion. 
In Chapter 3, a lobbying-influence model is presented to discuss how the 
outcomes of trade policy is influenced by lobbying activities during the policy-
making process. A comparison of the welfare-maximizing model and the 
lobbying-influence model under a game theory framework is undertaken. 
Chapter 4 provides a new explanation on the issue of asymmetric lobbying 
from the view point of the impact of external environment. Since the incentive 
of the domestic firm to engage in lobbying activities varies with its marginal 
costs, the outcomes of lobbying performance are different. This argument holds 
for both complete and incomplete information settings. 
Chapter 5 considers whether there is a positive role for lobbying activities 
in an incomplete information setting when the foreign entry is incorporated. 
The results suggest that the social welfare under the pooling equilibrium is 
higher than that under the separating equilibrium. As a result, there is no 
positive role for lobbying activities in this two-period model. 
Chapter 6 provides a political economy model to explain why trade taxes 
rather than more efficient income taxes might be adopted and what links the 
taxation choice and the economic development. In general, people prefers to 
pay less tax to the government. In a democratic society, a policy, which yields 
a higher utility to the majority of voters, is supported through majority voting. 
Therefore, the choice of taxation instruments depends on the tax payments, 
which are determined by the tax method, the income level, and the movement 
of income distribution over time. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
It seems that there is an enormous gap between what economists preach 
and what governments actually do in trade policy. Most economists believe 
that free trade is the best policy for a country. However, not all countries 
want, or are able to choose, a free trade policy (Baldwin, 1989; Krugman, 
1989; Magee, 1997; Riezman and Wilson, 1995; Rodrik, 1995). In fact, trade 
policies are made in the political process so that there is a close relationship 
between economics and politics in trade policy formulation. Unfortunately, 
most economic models assume that the government only considers public in-
terests and makes the optimal policy decisions by maximizing social welfare 
(Dixit, 1996; Mueller, 1997). In reality, government is a bureaucratic orga-
nization. Elected legislators, executives and bureaucrats not only have their 
own interests, but also have to coordinate with each other when policy is de-
cided. Individuals in private sector can organize interest groups to lobby in 
order to influence policy outcomes as well (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1994). 
That is why free trade is suggested in theory but protectionism is adopted 
in practice. As a result of this existing gap between academic and political 
community weakness, some economists have tried to incorporate a political 
dinlension in the analysis of trade policy, with the aims of explaining and un-
derstanding policy-making process and improving policy proposals (Grossman 
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and Helpman, 1994; Magee, Brock and Young, 1989; Mayer, 1984; Magee, 
1997; Riezman and Wilson, 1995; Rodrik, 1995). 
In the political economy of trade policy literature, it is generally recognized 
that interest groups can influence policy outcomes through lobbying activities 
and that rent-seeking lobbying behaviour decreases social welfare (Bhagwati, 
1982; Findly and Wellisz, 1982; Helpman, 1997; Krueger, 1974; Moor and 
Suranovic, 1993). The role of lobbying activities can be analyzed further in a 
strategic lobbying-influence model as follows. First of all, despite the fact that 
an interest group can influence the results of trade policy, the level of trade 
protection obtained by each interest group varies. We need to understand why 
different interest groups have different impact on policy outcomes and therefore 
why asymmetric lobbying occur. Secondly, regardless of the fact that lobbying 
expenditure is a kind of dead weight loss and that social welfare decreases in a 
complete information setting, lobbying activities can bring information about 
industry. 'We need to ask: Is it possible that there is a positive role for lobbying 
when information is incomplete? In addition, politics can not only influence 
the level of a protection policy but also the choice of a protection instrument 
among policy alternatives. Notwithstanding, many policies are available for a 
specific policy purpose. We need to explain why a specific policy emerges as 
a political equilibrium among the alternatives? For example, both trade taxes 
and income taxes can be collected in order to balance government budget. 
How is a taxation policy selected in the policy-making process? In this thesis, 
a political economy of trade policy approach is used to analyze these issues. 
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The thesis contains four papers together with an introduction, literature 
review, and a conclusion. Chapter 2 offers a selective survey of the political 
economy of trade policy literature, with a focus on five major political econ-
omy of trade policy approaches, asymmetric lobbying and the choice among 
policy alternatives. In Chapter 3, a lobbying-influencing model is built in or-
der to discuss how lobbying activities influence the trade policy outcome in 
the policy-making process. In the political economy of trade policy literature, 
much research incorporates lobbying activities through the general equilibrium 
framework of the Heckscher-Ohlin model or the specific factor model in order 
to explain why trade protection is adopted (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982; Magee, 
Brock and Young, 1989; Mayer, 1984; Van Long and Vousden, 1991). How-
ever, game theory is also a good analytical methodology that can be applied 
to analyze the interaction between politics and economics (Myerson, 1997). 
Therefore, a lobbying-influencing model based on game theory is needed from 
the political economy of trade policy point of view. In the trade theory liter-
ature, strategic trade policy has already used game theory as a framework 
to discuss the implications of trade policy (Brander, 1995). The political 
economy model in this chapter assumes that policy is determined by firms 
through lobbying behaviour, while policy is decided by a welfare-maximizing 
government in the strategic trade policy model. Therefore, a comparison of 
the welfare-maximizing and lobbying-influencing models under the same game 
theory setting is presented. 
Chapter 4 includes the result of analysis of why different interest groups 
have different impacts on policy outcomes in complete and incomplete infor-
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mation settings. In the political economy of trade policy literature, much 
research has incorporated lobbying activities in order to explain why a gov-
ernment chooses protectionism rather than a free trade policy (Findlay and 
Wellisz, 1982; Grossman and Helpman, 1996). However, the issue of why the 
level of protection obtained by each interest group through lobbying activities 
varies is still unclear to us. Some explanations on why asymmetric lobbying 
occurs are provided in the public choice literature. On the one hand, the for-
mation of an interest group, such as the number of firms and the heterogeneity 
of an interest group are key factors, determines its ability to influence policy 
outcomes (Olson, 1965; Long and Souberyran, 1996). At the same time, the 
competition among interest groups also influences the results of lobbying activ-
ities (Becker, 1983, 1985). On the other hand, the external environment must 
also have an impact on lobbying performance, but this perspective is generally 
neglected in the literature. Specifically, when domestic firms have different 
level of international cost competitiveness, the incentives for these firms to en-
gage in lobbying activities are also different. That is why asymmetric lobbying 
occurs. This approach offers an alternative explanation to that presented in 
the current literature. 
Chapter 5 is the report of an examination of whether there is a positive role 
for lobbying in an incomplete information setting. It is generally accepted that 
lobbying activities are a kind of rent-seeking behaviour, which may lead to a 
decrease of social welfare (Krueger, 1974; Bhagwati, 1982). However, lobbying 
activities can also provide information about industries, which may increase 
social welfare (Austen-Smith, 1990; Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1994). As a 
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result, there may be a positive role for lobbying activities in an incomplete 
information case. In the public choice literature, some research has investi-
gated the issue of the positive role of lobbying when information is incomplete 
(Rasmusen, 1993; Lohmann, 1995; Largerlof, 1997). However, their models 
do not consider the possibility of potential entry. We need to notice that the 
actual and potential threats of foreign competition are important in the trade 
policy-making. Therefore, we incorporate potential foreign entry into the two-
period lobbying-influencing model in order to understand the change of social 
welfare in an incomplete information case. 
In Chapter 6, I discuss the choice between income taxes and trade taxes 
for different shapes of economic development under majority voting system. 
Evidence shows that tariffs are an important source of tax revenue in the early 
stage of economic development for almost every country, and income taxes are 
often adopted in the later stage of economic development (Baack and Ray, 
1983; Conybeare, 1983; Riezmzn and Wilson, 1995; Rodrik, 1995). That is 
to say, poor countries rely more heavily on trade taxes and the importance 
of tariffs decline with economic development. Since trade taxes are easy to 
handle in terms of lower collection costs, the more distorting trade taxes are 
used in the early economic development (Grant and Kimbrough, 1991). Once 
the protection tariffs are established, existing interests will fight against their 
removal. As a result, tariffs protection today may will be maintained tomorrow. 
A government cannot switch to more efficient income taxes easily (Brainard 
and Verider, 1993). However, the existing explanations neglect the following 
political economy issues. (1) How a taxation method is politically accepted as 
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a source of tax revenue. (2) The nature of the political economy relationship 
between different tax instruments and economic development. By assuming 
that policy is determined in a democratic society under majority voting, a 
political economy model is provided which offers a more complete picture of 
the choice among taxation methods. Finally , concluding remarks appear in 
chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
A large number of papers in recent years have considered various aspects 
of the political economy of trade policy. This chapter is not a comprehensive 
survey of all the literature but rather a selective survey concerning four main 
areas. The first of these areas, international political economy (IPE), is briefly 
reviewed in section 2.1. Specific attention is given to liberalism, nationalism 
and Marxism, which are three major IPE theories. Although all of these the-
ories seek to explain many IPE phenomena and provide a sound conceptual 
framework, the resulting research has been more or less descriptive. The sec-
ond of the areas, reviewed in section 2.2, concerns the explanations of how 
politics can influence the outcome of trade policy. Five major approaches are 
presented. Their main finding is that self-interested political actors such as 
politicians, interest groups and voters would pursue their own interests so that 
protection instead of a free trade policy is adopted in almost every c01mtry. 
Section 2.3 considers the issue of why the level of protection obtained by each 
industry varies. One possible answer is that different industries, declining and 
expanding industries for example, have different capabilities to organize lob-
bying activities, and therefore have different impacts on policy formulation. 
Section 2.4 looks at the issue of choice among policy instruments. We need 
to consider why a specific policy, say tariff policy, is chosen among all alter-
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natives, although many policy instruments are available for the same policy 
purpose. Section 2.5 offers some conclusions. 
2.1 International Political Economy 
International political economy (IPE) is concerned with the connection 
between politics and economics in international relations (Gilpin, 1987). In the 
field of IPE, there are three major schools of thought: liberalism, nationalism 
and Marxism. Based on individualism and rationalism, liberalism argues that 
the pursuit of self-interest will lead to the public good. Since the market 
can work very well, it should be free from political interference. Liberalism 
therefore argues that politics and economics are separate domains. Freedom 
is a crucial element in order to enable the invisible hand to operate, and the 
only thing that governments should do is to guarantee that individuals have 
equal freedom to pursue their goals. Free market, minimal state intervention, 
individual equality and liberty are the main themes in liberalism. Moreover, 
liberals argue that free trade is the best policy since everyone will gain from free 
trade, although not equally, according to their efficiency and factor endowment. 
Under a free trade system, specialization and the international division of 
labor increase individual productivity so that national and global wealth are 
accumulated and the consumption possibilities are enlarged. 
In fact, the issue of free trade and protectionism lies at the heart of the 
conflict between economic liberals and economic nationalists. Liberals argue 
that each economy has a comparative advantage in some sectors of production 
and will therefore benefit from free trade. Through each economy doing "what 
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it can do best, regardless of what that is, everyone can gain. For nationalists, 
however, who produces what is important. Nationalism argues that state reg-
ulation of economic activity in the interests of the national economy, thereby 
maximizing state power and wealth, is the best means of ensuring public wel-
fare (Crane and Amawi, 1991). In other words, liberals and nationalists have 
different objectives and judge the success of policies according to different stan-
dards. Liberals judge trade and protectionism in terms of consumer welfare 
and the maximization of global efficiency. Nationalists stress the importance 
of state interests and the needs of national producers. 
Marxism holds that political conflicts arise from the struggle among classes 
over the distribution of wealth. Capitalism is driven by capitalists striving 
for profits and capital accumulation in a competitive market economy, and 
labour has been dispossessed and reduced to a commodity that is subject 
to the price mechanism. Moreover, the expansion of capital accumulation 
at the international level develops the world unevenly. Each country grows 
at different rates and this differential growth of national power will lead to 
imperialism, war and change in the international political economy (Lenin, 
1975). Although Marxism provides a more complete account of the interaction 
of economic, political and social factors, and hence broadens the scope of IPE. 
However, the analysis is historical and conceptual. 
In general, the three theories are more or less normative and cannot be 
separated from their ideological fOlmdations. Since economic policy is chosen 
by political agents through political process, a more analytical approach which 
9 
incorporates the policy-making process into the IPE framework, is needed. 
2.2 Politics and Trade Policy: Five Approaches 
Since the outcome of trade policy is influenced by political actors in the 
policy-making process, Rodrik (1995) suggests that a political economy of 
trade policy must contain elements on the supply and the demand sides of 
policy formulation. On the one hand, not only do interest groups seek to gain 
some protection rents through lobbying and campaign contributions, but also 
individual voters take political actions to reinforce policy outcomes. On the 
other hand, trade policy is no longer decided by a benevolent dictator, who sets 
the optimal policy in order to maximize social welfare. Both the preferences 
of policymakers, such as winning an election, and the institutional structure 
of government within which policy-making takes places have an impact on the 
policy outcomes. 
In the political economy of trade policy literature, there are five leading 
approaches which discuss the trade policy-making process: political support 
function, tariff-formation function, direct democracy, representative democ-
racy, and influence-driven approaches. In general, these models take either 
the specific-factor model or the Heckscher-Ohlin model as a framework. The 
policy-maker is assumed to choose trade policies in order to maximize a cer-
tain distributional income, while individuals or interest groups take actions in 
order to shape the policy-maker's preferences. 
(1) The political support function 
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In this approach, a government is no longer viewed as a benevolent dictator 
which sets the optimal policy in order to maximize social welfare. The policy-
maker is assumed to care about not only the efficiency consequences of protec-
tionism but also the political influence of an organized interest group. In other 
words, the policy-maker optimizes a political support function which trades off 
the gains from protection to the industry against the efficiency losses to the 
public. If the gains of an industry and the losses of consumers are weighted 
equally, there is no difference between the political support and social welfare 
functions. The difference between a traditional model and a political support 
model exists only if the weights are different. Since different interest groups can 
offer different levels of political support to a government, for example through 
campaign funds, a government considers its own interests and decides whether 
or not it is worth redistributing income. 
Hilman (1989) considers the situation in which tariffs are set by an incum-
bent government seeking to maximize its aggregate support. The government 
gains more support from consumers if the tariff, and therefore the price, is 
low. However, industry will provide more support if the tariff is high and, 
accordingly the industry's profit is also high. Although this approach clearly 
considers the objectives of policy-makers, it nevertheless neglects the explicit 
demand-side preference of politically influential actors. Moreover, it does not 
tell us explicitly about the formation of a political support function. Campaign 
contributions do not enter directly into the analysis, and the political compe-
tition of the next election is kept in the backgr01md. While the incumbent 
government maximizes its political support in the hope of being re-elected. 
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the election itself is not explicitly considered, nor are the positions of potential 
rivals. 
(2) The tariff-formation function 
Since lobbying activities can influence policy outcomes, Findlay and Wellisz 
(1982) assume that the level of protection reflects the outcome of a competi-
tion between interest groups with different policy demands. In a specific-factor 
model, suppose that one interest group owns resources in an import industry 
which lobbies for a tariff, and another interest group owns resources in an 
export industry which lobbies against a tariff. Therefore, the tariff rate de-
pends on the amount of resources devoted to lobbying by the supporters of 
protection and by the lobbying efforts of the opposition to protection. That 
is to say, the tariff-formation function relates the tariff rate to the two lev-
els of lobbying effort. The tariffs are higher if the import-competing industry 
lobbies harder; the tariffs are lower if the other industry puts more effort into 
lobbying. However, the paper stipulate no conditions guaranteeing a positive 
tariff, leaving open the possibility that a negative tariff may prevail if the 
exported-good lobby is sufficiently strong. Notwithstanding, if the ownership 
of a sector-specific factor is more concentrated, the rate of protection is more 
likely to be higher. Wellisz and Wilson (1986) show that a positive tariff exists 
if the import-competing industry is relatively small, as measured by the na-
tional income possessed by its specific-factor owners, because the lobbying of 
the import-competing interest group is more effective than that of the export 
interest group. In general, the problem with this approach is that it fails to 
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consider the supply side of trade policy, as expressed in the preference of a 
government, and only the demand side of trade policy is analyzed. 
However, Moor and Suranovic (1993) construct a strategic trade policy 
model with lobbying, which considers both the supply side and demand side 
of trade policy. The domestic government announces its subsidy in order to 
maximize total profits, net of subsidy payments and lobbying costs, at the 
first stage and the firm chooses outputs and lobbying contribution in order 
to maximize its own profit. Since lobbying costs are included, social welfare 
is necessarily lower than in the Brander and Spencer (1985) case. An export 
subsidy may not improve national welfare, because lobbying activities are a 
kind of rent-seeking behaviour. As a result, the result of the argument for 
strategic intervention is weakened when lobbying activities occur. However, 
this model still does not tell us explicitly about how the government's objective 
function is formed. 
In the public choice literature, Rasmusen (1993, 1997) investigates the role 
of lobbying in an incomplete information setting. A two-player game between 
a lobbyist and a politician is considered. Suppose that nature chooses the pref-
erence of voters for a new policy. However, only the lobbyist knows whether 
the voters like this policy or not, and the politician does not have this pri-
vate information. The lobbyist incurs a direct cost for lobbying, but not for 
lying. When lobbying occurs, the politician can use expenditure in order to 
verify the lobbyist's assertions. If there is no lobbying, the politician can pay 
for an independent investigation. The results suggest that lobbyists always 
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lobby if voters actually want the new policy. Otherwise, lobbyists only some-
times lobby. Politician might verify the information offered by the lobbyist, 
but will never investigate it independently. Therefore, lobbying can work as 
a signal. Similarly, Lohmann (1995) also argues that interest group lobbying 
plays an important information role. Policymakers are often imperfectly in-
formed about the consequences of various policy alternatives. In this situation, 
lobbying activities may have an impact on political decisions because of their 
information content, and not primarily because of the contributions made by 
interest groups to policymakers. If the conflict between the policy-maker and 
the interest groups and the cost of sending a message are not too large, the 
interest group's information can be fully revealed prior to the policy-maker's 
decision. 
Largerlof (1997) investigates the issue of when and for whom lobbying 
is welfare improving in the information transmission. Consider two interest 
groups A and B. B's income is certain but A's income depends on the state of 
nature. The government is willing to provide A with insurance if the state of 
nature is bad. However, the government does not know whether a good or bad 
state occurs. Each interest group can choose whether to spend expenditure 
on investigating the true state of of nature and then report the information 
to the government. If the cost of information acquisition is not too great, 
there will exist an equilibrium where A investigates and then reports a bad 
state. Accordingly, the government will decide its transfer if the above equilib-
rium exists. Otherwise, the government makes its decision lmder llncertaint:,-". 
However, lobbying is not necessarily welfare-improving, even where lobbying 
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provides information. When interest group A is worse off from his opportu-
nity to lobby, the government cares about the well-being of interest group A 
and therefore compensates A for the costs of investigation by redistributing 
income between the two groups. As a result, B is worse off, because it has to 
share some costs of investigation. Since both A and B are worse off, so is the 
government. Moreover, it may also be the case that some people are better off 
from lobbying while others are worse off. 
In addition, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) investigate whether the 
presence of domestic political pressures may induce a government to unilater-
ally join a free-trade agreement. In a small country, two-sector model, suppose 
that capital is immobile in the short run but mobile in the long run, and that 
only one industry is able to coalesce into a lobby. Three possibilities are con-
sidered. First, if the government has a strong bargaining position and can 
offer protection in exchange for contributions from the lobby, more rent can 
be extracted from the political process. If the government has only a small 
amount of bargaining power, the distortions caused by protection cannot be 
fully cornpensated. Therefore, the government may commit to free trade. Sec-
ondly, an industry that is relatively inefficient might lobby for protection. If 
the economy starts from free trade, no capital is allocated to the inefficient 
sector. Hence, there is no lobbying for protection. If resources are invested in 
the industry initially, the industry could lobby in order to obtain protection. 
Thirdly, the political process may cause a distortion in the speed at which 
resources exit from a declining industry when an industry faces a negative 
shock. If the government can compensate for the distortion in the speed of 
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adjustment, firms will exit that sector at a slower rate than under free trade. 
(3) Direct democracy: the median voter 
Assume that politicians are self-interested and desire to stay in office, then 
they will enact those policies that satisfy the majority of voters. Mayer (1984) 
uses the concept of majority voting over tariff levels, according to which a tariff 
is determined through the preference of the median voter. In a standard two-
commodities model, assume that capital and labour are perfectly mobile, all 
markets are competitive, and the firm's production function is homogeneous of 
degree one. Suppose that all individuals have identical, homothetic preferences 
but differ in their relative factor endowments. Since factor ownership consti-
tutes part of individual income, the relationship between a tariff and a given 
person's income share in turn depends on that person's endowments, as well as 
on the production structure through which factor returns and commodities are 
linked. The tariff rate is higher when the median voter's share of ownership of 
the sector-specific input is higher, when the sector output is larger, and when 
the slope of the import demand function is smaller. If the imported good is a 
labour-intensive product, a worker will favor an import duty, while a capitalist 
will favor free trade. Under a majority voting rule, protection would be the 
outcome if there are more workers than capitalists. If we can redistribute in-
come and compensate losers without extra cost, free trade will be chosen since 
everyone is better off than they are under protection. If there exist voting 
costs, an industry prefers tariffs, because other interests may find that voting 
against protection is not worthwhile for the specific factor case. Nevertheless, 
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direct democracy is seldom used on broadly ranging multi-dimensional issues. 
Perhaps a better theory of trade protection requires a model which successfully 
marries electoral politics with pressure group politics. 
( 4) Representative democracy: campaign contributions 
The first three approaches focus on how an incumbent government makes 
decisions within a political process. However, political parties seek office 
through election and therefore need resources to campaign in a democratic 
society. In order to improve the chance of being elected, each politician, who 
maximizes his probability of winning the election, will shape policies for special 
interests which must be implemented after the election. Interest groups evalu-
ate their policy proposals and make campaign contributions to the party that 
promises them the highest level of welfare. The party uses these resources to 
sway the voters, who are imperfectly informed about the candidates positions 
and are ignorant of the consequences of trade policy, in order to increase the 
chance of being elected. 
Magee, Brock and Young (1989) use a Heckscher-Ohlin model with two lob-
bies and two parties 1 to incorporate the above ideas. The parties are assumed 
to be either pro-trade or pro-protectionism, and each lobby represents one 
factor of production. Each party's election probability increases with the cam-
paign contributions it receives, but decreases according to the level of policy 
intervention it commits itself to. The results indicate policy polarization, pos-
itive lobbying and Pareto inefficient allocations. However, this model has two 
1 According to Duverger's law, there are two main parties under systems of plurality rule. 
See Osborne (1995). 
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shortcomings: there is an artificial restriction on the parties' platforms, which 
are either pro-export or pro-protection, and probabilistic voting is used with-
out a rational-choice foundation (Austin-Smith, 1990). Moreover, Mayer and 
Li (1994) incorporate uncertainty in order to tackle both criticisms. Suppose 
that voters do not know exactly the policy preferences of the two parties, and 
the parties are uncertain about some aspects of voter preferences. Therefore, 
each party uses campaign contributions to clarify its position and to reduce 
uncertainty. Thus campaign contributions enhance electoral strength. 
In addition, Clark and Thomas (1995) represent this model in a standard 
two-stage game framework. At the first stage, both parties choose their elec-
toral platform simultaneously by taking into account the reaction of both lob-
bies. At the second stage, when the lobbies observe two policies, they simulta-
neously choose their lobby contributions to their own party so as to maximize 
their expected utility. If party l's policy yields a higher sum of utilities than 
that of party 2, party 2 will change its policy position in order to increase 
support. By following exactly the same policy as party 1, party 2 can always 
guarantee itself an election probability of one-half; thus equilibrium is reached. 
In other words, both parties set identical policies and no lobbying occurs, so 
that the efficient allocation is obtained, which is in contrast to the results of 
Magee, Brock and YOlmg (1989). 
(5) The influence-driven approach 
Quite often, different political actors simultaneously try to influence the 
actions of the politician in the economic policy-making process (Dixit, 1996). 
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For example, legislators respond to different pressures, including those from 
voters, contributors and party officials. Therefore, a common agent approach, 
which describes a multilateral relationship, can be applied. Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) use this framework to model special interest groups mak-
ing political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's 
choice of trade policy. In a small open economy, each individual has iden-
tical preferences but different factor endowments. The factor owners in the 
same industry can organize an interest group in order to seek protection for 
the industry. In a two-stage non-cooperative game, the interest groups move 
first, offering politicians campaign contributions which depend on the policy 
positions of candidates, and seeking to maximize their own benefits. Then 
politicians choose their policies, knowing that their campaign money depends 
on their choice of policy outcome. There is no explicit competition among 
politicians, but there is a single incumbent who maximizes a weighted sum of 
total political contributions and aggregate welfare. An inverse tariff formation 
function is used in the sense that the contributions of interest groups are de-
termined by the tariff rate. Each lobby sets its contribution schedule so that 
the marginal change in the contribution for a small change in policy matches 
the effect of the policy change on the lobby's gross welfare. The results suggest 
that the rate of protection in one sector is higher the more concentrated the 
ownership of the sector-specific in that sector, the less weight the policy-maker 
places on welfare relative to contributions, the larger the output level of the 
sector, and the flatter the import demand flllction. 
This model is interesting, but it gives rise to some problems. First, if we 
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consider the structure of government, especially in terms of legislative organi-
zation, it might be suggested that different principals can find different agents 
(legislators) to pursue their interests, and that these legislators can together 
decide the policy outcome. As a result, the common agent approach is one 
way of trying to model the conflicting interests, but it neglects the role of the 
legislature. Secondly, the conclusions are based on a very general analysis of 
Bernheim and Whinston (1986). This high level of generality makes it difficult 
to say very much about the nature of the resulting political equilibrium apart 
from the fact that it exists. Since Bernheim and Whinston (1986) assume 
quasi-linear preference, which implies constant marginal utilities of income, 
and therefore the actions of the policy-maker are independent of the distribu-
tion of payoffs among principals. Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) extend 
preferences with nontransferable utility, which is more suitable for a general 
analysis, and prove that the principals' truth-telling strategies constitute an 
efficient action in a Nash equilibrium. 
Grossman and Helpman (1995) use the influence-driven contributions ap-
proach to characterize trade wars and trade talks. Consider the trade relation 
between two countries with similar political and economic systems. Each indi-
vidual has identical, additively separable preferences. The government can tax 
or subsidize trade to effect any income redistribution between groups in the 
economy. Since some individuals own some specific factors, with their common 
desire for protection, they may choose to express their policy wishes to the in-
cumbent government. Governments therefore bargain internationally, trying 
to get the best deal for their citizens and at the same time raising campaign 
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contributions from special interests, and then set trade policy. When govern-
ments negotiate trade policies, they are aware of the likely political response 
at home. In other words, governments set trade policies by facing each other 
in the international arena, and each government has to deal with its national 
political system. Negotiations over trade taxes lead special interests from an 
industry in the two countries to take opposing sides on the issue; each one of 
them wants to be protected at the expense of the other. Hence, they exert 
opposing pressures on the negotiating parties, and the winner is the lobby with 
the larger political clout. A change in the political environment in one country 
affects the resulting degree of protection in the other. Therefore, the trade 
policies of the two countries depend on both countries' political environments. 
Taking a free trade agreement as an example, the interest groups, repre-
senting various industries, express their concerns by means of campaign contri-
butions, and can voice their support or opposition to the agreement. Suppose 
that a country decides whether to join the agreement or not. An agreement 
requires both countries to select a joint regime to achieve political equilibrium. 
If joining provides higher welfare, then the government will be happy to sign 
an agreement in order to please its voters. However, it is not very likely that 
the agreement will be supported by all sectors. For example, exporting sectors, 
which expect to sell more in other countries, will support an open economy, 
while importing sectors, which expect to face fierce competition, will oppose 
the agreement. If some politically sensitive sectors can be excluded from the 
agreement and be allowed to maintain the original rates of protection, both 
countries are more likely to endorse an agreement. Moreover, both countries 
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may not have the same ranking of exclusions. When a conflict arises over the 
set of exemptions, the countries need to reach a comprise in order to enact a 
free trade agreement. 
To sum up, according to the literature, political support, lobbying and 
elections are the three key determinants of protection. Different approaches 
consider different determinants in the formulation of trade policy. On the sup-
ply side of policy, policy-makers not only maximize social welfare, acting in the 
role of a benevolent dictator; they also maxirnize political support in pursuit 
of self-interest. On the demand side of policy, interest groups are willing to 
spend money in order to influence policy outcomes through lobbying. More-
over, voting behaviour and the desire to win elections show respectively the 
demand side of individual preferences and the supply side of political inter-
ests. A satisfactory treatment of all elements in the policy-making process still 
needs more research on these issues. 
2.3 Asymmetric Protection 
In the previous section, we discussed how policy outcomes can be influenced 
by lobbying and elections in the policy-making process. On the one hand in-
terest groups try to lobby government in order to influence policy outcomes 
favoring them; and, on the other hand, a political party proposes its policy po-
sition in order to attract votes and win an election. Although policy outcomes 
are influenced by politics, it is still unclear why protection is asymmetric. That 
is to say, the level of protection obtained by each interest group varies. In this 
section, we focus on the issue of why interest groups have different impact on 
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policy formulation and use declining and expanding industries as an example 
for more detailed discussion. 
(1) The determinants of asymmetric lobbying 
In the political economy literature, two views are provided: the formation 
of interest groups and competition among interest groups. On the issue of the 
formation of interest groups for lobbying, Olson (1965) provides a classic analy-
sis in The Logic of Collective Action. This book seeks to investigate whether 
groups of individuals with common interests will act according to those com-
mon interests or not. It has been thought that if individuals in groups are 
rational and self-interested, groups will act to further their interests because 
all individuals are better off if the collective objectives are achieved. However, 
Olson (1965) points out that rational and self-interested individuals will not 
act to achieve their common interests unless the number of individuals in a 
group is quite small or there is some special device to make individuals act 
in their common interests. The reason is that lobbying outcomes are a public 
good and all members of an interest group have common interests in obtaining 
it. However, individuals prefer to be free riders, who can enjoy the benefits 
of lobbying outcome without paying any money. Therefore, members in the 
group do not have mutual interests in sharing the costs of lobbying activities. 
Olson uses the above idea to challenge group theory in political science. He 
shows that the incentive of interest groups to organize lobbying depends on 
the ability of the interest group to overcome free rider problems in collective 
political action. As a result, when the number of menlbers in the group l~ 
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large, the organizational cost is large, and thus the likelihood of organizing a 
powerful interest group and of obtaining the collective good is reduced. In the 
same way, when the number of members in the group is small, it is easier to 
avoid the free rider problem, and therefore more influential lobbying activities 
can begin. That is to say, since relatively small interest groups will be able to 
organize and act in support of their common interests, and since large interest 
groups will not be able to do so, the outcome of the political influence among 
various interest groups in the policy-making process will not be symmetrical. 
However, Pecorino (1998) show that the ability to receive protection through 
lobbying activities does not necessarily become more difficult as the number 
of firms in the industry rises. The cooperative outcome may be maintained 
in a repeated tariff lobbying game when a trigger strategy is used. Suppose 
that the payoff of each firm under the cooperative equilibrium is 1fc. If a firm 
deviates from the cooperative equilibrium, the payoffs are assume to be the 
sum of 1fd for current period and 1fn in all future periods with a discOlmt factor 
8. As a result, if the payoff obtained from deviating cooperative lobbying is 
higher than the payoff from continued cooperation, the firm will defect and not 
undertake cooperative lobbying. The necessary condition for maintaining a co-
operative lobbying outcome under a trigger strategy is 1fd + L:: 8t1fn < L:: 8t1fc. 
Therefore the effect of an increase in the number of firms in the industry on , 
the difficulty of maintaining cooperative lobbying depends on the critical value 
of the discount parameter. If the discount parameter is higher than the critical 
value, then the cooperative equilibrium is supported. The industry can over-
come free-rider problem even with an infinite number of firms. If the discount 
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parameter is below the critical value, then standard intuition holds. Perfect 
competition industry is unlikely to bring cooperative lobbying activities. 
Long and Soubeyran (1996) also investigate the determinants of asymmet-
ric lobbying from a heterogeneity point of view. Suppose that an interest group 
consists of domestic firms in an oligopolistic industry facing foreign competi-
tion from imports. The domestic firms are heterogeneous in the sense that they 
have different unit costs, and the variance of the distribution of the unit costs 
within the group is a measure of the group's heterogeneity. In the first stage, 
all domestic firms decide their own lobbying expenditures non-cooperatively. 
The government determines the tariff rate, which is influenced by the aggre-
gate donations. Alternatively, all domestic firms can cooperate and decide 
together how much each must contribute in a Nash bargaining process. In the 
second stage, the domestic firms, knowing the tariff rate annOlllced by the 
government, compete in outputs as Cournot rivals in the market. They find 
that the total lobbying expenditure depends on the degree of heterogeneity 
of the industry and on the shape of the demand curve, and that the large 
firms do not necessarily contribute more than smaller firms. If the demand 
elasticity is negative, the bigger firm spends more lobbying money, because a 
tariff increases the outputs of larger firms rather than those of smaller firms. 
Therefore, an increase in the degree of heterogeneity of the domestic firms may 
increase the total lobbying expenditure for tariff protection. That is to say, 
the degree of heterogeneity of a group has important implications for its total 
lobbying expenditure and hence its degree of success. 
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On the issue of competition among interest groups, Becker (1983, 1985) 
argues that actual political choices are determined by the efforts of groups to 
further their own interests, and that competition among interest groups for 
political influence determines the structure of protection. Assume that there 
are only two homogeneous interests groups in society, and that the levels of 
taxes and subsidies to each group are determined by an influence function that 
depends on the pressure exerted by both groups. Since a member of each group 
maximizes his utility by spending money on political activities to create pres-
sure that affects his subsidies or taxes, these expenditures compete with each 
other for political influence. Since subsidies are financed by equivalent taxes, 
the increasing influence of one group decreases the influence of the other by 
the same amount. The equilibrium level of taxes and subsidies depends on the 
interaction between groups, and therefore a group that becomes more efficient 
at producing political pressure will be able to reduce its taxes or raise its subsi-
dies. If both interests groups have equal political influence, and one group can 
gain more than another's loss, gainers will exert more political pressure than 
losers in order to implement the policy. Nevertheless, this analysis ignores two 
important questions: what are the determinants of a group's political influ-
ence? and what makes an interest group more powerful in organizing political 
activities? 
(2) Asymmetric protection between declining and expanding indus-
tries 
In this section, we take declining and expanding industries as an example 
26 
to discuss why asymmetric protection occurs when both can spend on lobby-
ing to raise profits via protection. Baldwin (1993) and Baldwin and Baldwin 
(1996) argue that expanding and contracting industries face asymmetric ap-
propriability of the benefits of lobbying in the presence of sunk entry costs. 
Asymmetry arises because a marginal increase in protection will attract new 
entrants in an expanding industry, but not in a contracting one. If expanding 
industries lobby the government for support, there will be more entries than 
otherwise. These entries will continue until the benefits of lobbying equal the 
costs of lobbying, and therefore the rents will be dissipated by new entrants. 
That is to say, the policy-created rents attract new entries that erode the rents. 
The profits of the incumbent before and after lobbying are almost the same, 
and thus there is no incentive for the incumbent to do any lobbying. On the 
other hand, if declining industries undertake similar political activities, the re-
sults of lobbying can raise the profits back to the normal rate of return, and so 
no entrant will be attracted to share the rents of lobbying. Consequently, the 
problem of rent appropriability is more serious in expanding industries than in 
declining industries. Hence, we should observe more lobbying from declining 
industries than from expanding industries, and therefore more protection is 
obtained from governments for declining industries. 
However, Grossman and Helpman (1996) follow Olson's idea and argue 
that it is the potential of free riding that discourages expanding industries 
from engaging in costly lobbying activities, regardless of whether the rents 
are dissipated by new entrants or not. Suppose that firms share donations 
and organize an interest group to lobby government. Nevertheless, once the 
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lobbying has taken place and the government has committed itself to a support 
policy, new firms enter the market. The new entrants cannot be forced to 
contribute to the lobbying costs, and thus they become free riders. Since entry 
will occur until the profits of entrants are zero, if the entry costs are zero, the 
incumbent will end up with negative profits which are equal to incumbent's 
lobbying contribution. Under such circumstances, the incumbent will not lobby 
in the first place because the lobbying costs are larger than the entry costs. 
That is why declining industries are more capable than expanding industries 
of overcoming the free-rider problem associated with interest group politics. 
When an industry is declining, the profits of existing firms are decreasing 
or even negative. This situation is unlikely to attract new entrants into the 
market who can free ride on the efforts of lobbying activities. In contrast, 
when an industry is expanding, the profits of existing firms are increasing. 
Therefore, there is an incentive for entrants to enter the market even without a 
government-supportive policy. As a consequence, new entrants are able to free 
ride on the results of the lobbying which is undertaken by others. Accordingly, 
if an expanding industry cannot prevent the free rider problem and force all 
new entrants to share the costs of lobbying equally, then lobbying activities 
may not achieve a political equilibrium. 
The issue of the protection of a declining industry has been studied from 
other points of views besides lobbying. Dixit and Londregan (1996) consider 
why a government would compensate declining industries instead of enCOlll'-
aging the movement of resources to other more productive uses. They argue 
that the policy of redistributing income is determined on the basis of political 
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characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics 
rewarded by the market. Therefore, an economically inefficient way of trans-
ferring income is used. Suppose that there are two parties and voters split 
into a finite number of interest groups. The workers in the declining indus-
try, who seeks to maximize their disposable income, are considering whether 
to move into another industry or not. Moving will bring higher incomes and 
staying will result in lower incomes. Nevertheless, each political party will 
propose a lump sum transfer of money in order to maximize its votes sub-
ject to budget constraint. Therefore, workers will look ahead to this political 
process of income distribution and then decide their occupational and voting 
decisions. If moving can yield a positive benefit, then workers will move, and 
this will lead to an economically efficient outcome. In other words, the polit-
ical process offers an alternative. If the transfer policy can overcome income 
loss from staying in the declining industry, workers will stay and receive an 
economically inefficient compensation. Dixit and Londregan explain clearly 
the possibility for protection of a declining industry because workers can gain 
more compensation and total income due to the political characteristics. How-
ever, it is still unclear why it is the declining industry that has such favorable 
political characteristics, rather than the expanding industry. 
To sum up, the determinants of lobbying and the structure of protection 
depend on the following factors. (1) How an interest group can overcome the 
free-rider problem. (2) The degree of heterogeneity of firms in the industry. (3) 
The competition between interest groups. Moreover, the asymmetric lobbying 
between expanding and declining industries relies on entry associated with rent 
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dissipation and free riding problems. Nevertheless, another important factoL 
the influence of external environments, is neglected in the literature. After an 
interest group is formed, which particular conditions influence the incentives 
to engage in various levels of lobbying activities? Further research can be done 
along these lines. 
2.4 The Choice Among Alternative Policy Instruments 
As described in the previous section, politicians, interest groups and voters 
can influence policy outcomes in the policy-making process. However, there 
are many instruments which can be used for a specific policy purpose, protec-
tionism for example, and any instrument can serve the purpose in principle. 
How is a specific policy selected among policy alternatives? In this section, 
we focus on two issues concerning policy selection: the choice between tar-
iffs and income taxes, and the choice between tariffs and other trade policy 
instruments. 
(1) Tariffs and income taxes 
Trade theory often states that introducing a tariff reduces a country's wel-
fare in many circumstances. However, many countries do use tariffs as a pro-
tection policy in the early stage of economic development. Conybeare (1983) 
suggests that government revenue arguments can be used to explain this phe-
nomenon. Taking the United States as an example, tariffs provided an average 
of more than 50 percent of government revenue from 1870 to 1914 (Baack and 
Ray, 1983). Prior to the Civil War, this ratio actually stood at 90 percent. 
After introducing income taxes in 1913, the average U.S. tariffs rate dropped 
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sharply and income taxes became the major source of United States govern-
ment tax revenue. 
In addition, Conybeare (1983) estimates the relationship between average 
tariff level and gross domestic product per capita for 35 countries. The coeffi-
cient of gross domestic product per capita is negative and significant, indicating 
that tariff protection declines with economic development. The average tariff 
level for developing countries is about 50 percent, and the average tariff level 
for developed countries is around 11 percent. Similar cross-country evidence, 
which supports the hypothesis that poor countries rely more heavily on trade 
taxes, is also provided by Rodrik (1995). A robust negative relationship exists 
between per capita income and the share of trade taxes in total tax revenue. 
An increase in per capita income of 1,000 dollar is associated with a reduction 
in 3.7 percent of the share of taxes that originates from international trade. 
Grant and Kimbrough (1991) develop an optimal-revenue-raising tax pro-
gramme model and show that relative collection costs play an important role 
in explaining how tax regimes vary with different levels of government spend-
ing. Consider a small open economy that is specialized in the production of a 
single good which is consumed and exported in order to finance the consump-
tion of imported goods. Suppose that different collection costs are associated 
with each type of tax alternative. The representative consumer in the econ-
omy is assumed to maximize utility. The government is assumed to finance its 
spending using tariffs, excise taxes and income taxes as instruments so as to 
maximize the representative consumer's utility. The results suggest that the 
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tax rates, as well as the tax regime itself, depend on the ratio of government 
spending to national income. Collection costs introduce the possibility that 
an income tax regime will be adopted when the government spending-income 
ratio is sufficiently high. The benefits of avoiding more distorting taxes such as 
tariffs and exercise taxes are larger than the collection costs of income taxes. 
In other words, the use of tariffs is not an optimum tax policy unless they have 
an advantage over other types of taxes in terms of lower collection costs. 
In addition, when the economy is developed, most countries would like 
to remove protection policy and to liberalize trade. Why, then, do tariffs 
remain? There are three explanations in the literature: policy persistence, 
uncertainty and piecemeal reform. First, once a protective tariff is established, 
special interests are established. It is quite possible that those who rely on 
protection will oppose the removal of these tariffs. Brainard and Verdier (1994) 
use a dynamic version of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework to 
show the possibility that high protection today is more likely to lead to high 
protection tomorrow. 2 In a two-period model, when demand shock causes a 
price decrease and thereby employment supply exceeds its demand, an industry 
can either make costly adjustment or lobby politicians for protection. The 
choice depends on the relative profitability of adjustment versus lobbying. In 
each of the two periods, industry first chooses its contribution in order to 
influence the tariff level; the politician then chooses tariffs in order to maximize 
2When an economic policy is introduced, agents will often respond by undertaking actions 
in order to benefit from it. These actions increase their willingness to pay for the policy in 
the future. This extra willingness to pay will be translated into political pressure to retain 
the policy, and this means the policy is more likely to be protective in the future. See Coated 
and Morris (1995). 
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a combination of social welfare and lobbying contributions; finally, the industry 
chooses the level of adjustment. Since protection reduces adjustment, current 
adjustment diminishes future lobbying intensity, and current protection raises 
future protection. In other words, the second period optimal adjustment is 
a decreasing function of the second period tariff. The second period tariff is 
a decreasing function of the first period adjustment. Accordingly, the latter 
is an increasing function of the first period tariff. In addition, the higher the 
domestic price and the larger the initial employment stock in the first period, 
the less the industry adjusts; and the lower the first-period adjustment, the 
more the industry lobbies in period two and the higher is the second period 
tariff. 
Secondly, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) provide a possible answer from the 
uncertainty point of view, although it is not directly related to the choice 
between tariffs and income taxes. Since the distribution of gains and losses 
from reform cannot be identified ex ante in the policy-making process, lill-
certainty can lead to unpopular ex post reform to be adopted ex ante even 
if the majority of the population would vote in favour the reforms in the ab-
sence of uncertainty. In other words, trade reform would be supported under 
complete certainty, but would be rejected under uncertainty, according to the 
distribution of gains and losses from reform. 
Falvey and Lloyd (1991) also suggest that the choice of instruments of 
protection as well as the level of protection depend on the uncertainty charac-
teristics of an industry in terms of any disturbances in its market. Consider a 
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competitive import-competing industry that provides an homogeneous prod-
uct. The price of the foreign product is exogenous and depends on the state of 
nature. The price of the domestic product depends on both the distribution of 
the foreign price and the form and level of the protective instrument chosen. 
Suppose that the government selects a protective instrument for the industry 
so as to maximize a political support function. When the protective level is 
fixed, different instruments yield different distributions of the domestic price 
and household welfare for a given distribution of foreign price. Therefore, the 
selection of an optimal protective policy arise to choose the optimal domestic 
price in each state of nature. In an uncertain environment, households are not 
indifferent to the choice of instrument, because their ranking of instruments 
will differ according to their ownership of factors. Since different policies yield 
different outcomes in various environments, instruments that could provide 
higher levels of protection at lower world prices are preferred. 
Thirdly, Falvey and Kim (1992) suggest that the government should con-
sider the speed of liberation in trade reform. Should protection be removed 
immediately? Or should liberalization occur gradually? Falvey (1994) ob-
serves that a welfare-improving trade reform policy has been undertaken on 
a gradual basis rather than as one-shot affairs in many countries. Consider 
a perfectly competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy 
producing and consuming n internationally tradeable goods. The only possi-
ble distorting policies are taxes and subsidies when the government intervenes 
in the economy. However, tariffs are an important tax source of government, 
and the potential revenue loss of conducting tariff reform should be consid-
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ered as well. That is to say, trade liberalization, which cuts both import and 
export taxes, has a negative impact on the government budget. Restructur-
ing the tax system to give it a broader base will take time, and government 
revenue also needs to be maintained. Therefore, both welfare-improving and 
revenue-enhancing should be considered when the government embarks upon 
trade reform. The results show that such a reform package exists when the 
compensated radical elasticities of all tariffs in the reform set are not equal. 
To sum up, a government needs tax revenue to finance its budget. Since 
tariffs are easy to handle in terms of administrative and collection cost con-
siderations, trade taxes are used when countries are still in the early economic 
development stage (Riezman and Slemrod, 1984). When the economy is more 
developed, the tariffs still remain but their importance declines. Perhaps pro-
tection persistence, uncertainty about the reform results and the speed of 
reform provide some explanations. Nevertheless, the existing explanations in 
the literature leave some important questions in political economy unanswered: 
First, why are tariffs politically acceptable as a source of tax revenue when 
countries are poor? Secondly, why does greater development lead countries to 
rely more on income taxes? Thirdly, what is the political economic relation-
ship between different sources of tax revenue and economic development? A 
more fundamental answer to these questions from political economy needs to 
be provided. 
(2) The choice between tariffs and other instruments 
In this sub-section, two issues related to the choice between tariffs and other 
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instruments are discussed. First of all, we consider the choice between tariffs 
and subsidies. It is quite often observed that a government prefers import 
tariffs instead of export subsidies. Rodrik (1995) argues that a government 
needs tax revenue to balance its budget, and a tariff policy which can raise 
revenue rather than a subsidy policy which loses revenue is preferred by the 
government. An alternative explanation in terms of lobbying activity is also 
provided by Rodrik (1986). Assume that an industry lobbies government for 
export subsidies and another industry lobbies for tariffs. There are some dif-
ferences between these two policies: a subsidy policy is firm-specific, while an 
import tariff is industry-wide. Accordingly, the free rider problem associated 
with lobbying is more serious for the tariffs policy than the subsidies policy. 
An industry, therefore, will devote more resources to obtain protection through 
subsidies than through tariffs since the benefits of lobbying activities are en-
tirely private. As a result, the welfare-maximizing government prefers a tariffs 
policy to a subsidy policy because the dead-weight loss caused by lobbying 
activities is lower. 
Wilson (1990) provides a more elegant model which incorporates elections 
in order to discuss the choice between subsidies and tariffs. Suppose that two 
candidates compete to win office, and the probability of winning the election is 
a function of lobbying contributions. The politicians like to achieve power and 
therefore will make more protection transfers if the level of lobbying contribu-
tions is higher. However, trade protection policies will decrease social welfare. 
As a result, politicians may prefer to use a policy which produces higher social 
welfare. That is why politicians are reluctant to use subsidies, and a more in-
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efficient income transfer policy like tariffs emerges as the political equilibrium. 
In addition, Grossman and Helpman (1994) show a similar result in the lobby-
ing model. Since the effect of lobbying on policy outcome can be cancelled by 
cornpetition between groups, lobbies may support government transfer income 
in a less efficient way and offer lower contributions. Interest groups will not 
necessarily prefer the government to use more efficient means of transferring 
income to them. 
Secondly, we will turn to the choice between tariffs and non-tariffs restric-
tions such as voluntarily export restraints (VERs). In general, a tariffs policy 
extracts the profits of a foreign firm and is a source of government tax rev-
enue. VERs, like import quotas which limit competitive imports and benefit 
domestic firms, give the rents from restrictions of trade to foreign firms. In the 
political economy of trade policy literature, Hillman and Usprung (1989) incor-
porate elections into the model, which considers the interests of both domestic 
and foreign firms in order to explain the governmental choice between tariffs 
and VERso Suppose that the domestic and foreign firms compete in the do-
mestic market and that two candidates campaign for an election. A two-stage 
game is used. At the first stage, each candidate makes trade policy announce-
ments in order to maximize the probability of winning the election, knowing 
that the outcome is determined by campaign contributions. The protectionist 
candidate, who is supported by the domestic firms, seeks to maximize lobby-
ing contribution, while the liberal candidate, who is supported by the foreign 
firms, also tries to maximize the lobbying contribution in order to win the elec-
tion. At t.he second stage, each firm chooses outputs and expresses its polit.ical 
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support for a candidate via campaign contributions in order to maximize ex-
pected profits. Tariffs are divisive but VERs are consistent with candidates' 
policy positions, thus yielding mutual gains to both foreign firms and domes-
tic firms. Therefore, no candidate will propose a tariffs policy if VERs are a 
policy option. However, a Cournot-quantity competition is assumed in this 
paper. In this case, the foreign profits of VERs, are therefore smaller than 
the profits of a free trade policy. VERs are involuntary. It is unreasonable for 
foreign firms to lobby and provide campaign money to a candidate for a less 
profitable policy. As a result, it might be a good idea to include a free trade 
policy and choose among free trade, tariffs and VERs policies 
However, it is widely believed that tariff rates have come down due to 
international trade agreements, and that the use of a non-tariff barriers policy 
has increased. Perhaps non-tariff barriers are used to replace tariffs that are 
prohibited under W.T.O. treaties. Alternatively, Magee, Brock and Young 
(1990) point out that non-tariff protection may offer a political advantage over 
tariffs because its effects are less likely to be observed by those who bear the 
costs. VERs may fall into this category if voters who are hurt by protection are 
less able to associate their losses with the form of protection. Moreover, Falvey 
(1988) discusses the welfare implication of piecemeal policy reform, when both 
tariffs and quota are used in a small country. Consider two categories of 
goods: one subject to import tariffs, and the other subject to quantitative 
restrictions. When trade reform is undertaken, the welfare change of tariffs 
and quota policy can be calculated. The results show that no reform should be 
introduced if there are no distortions in the initial equilibrium. If the quota-
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restricted goods are net substitutes for all other goods, piecemeal tariff reform 
reduction in all tariffs raises welfare. If all commodities are net substitutes , 
then a piecemeal quota reform will increase welfare. In addition, a process 
of piecemeal reform, which begins from quantitative distortions rather than 
tariffs, is less constrained. 
In sum, the choice among policy instruments is an important and interest-
ing question which needs more research from political economy point of view. 
In this section, we have briefly reviewed the literature on the choices between 
trade taxes and income taxes, between tariffs and subsidies, and between tariffs 
and VERso In general, tariffs policy has been widely used to protect domestic 
industry in trade history, because it is an important resource for tax revenue 
in the early stage of economic development. When the economy is developed 
and more policy instruments are provided, tariffs policy might be no longer 
used for the purpose of protection. That is why non-tariffs barrier and more 
export-oriented trade policy are observed. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In the making of economic policy, the relationship between economics and 
politics is close. In practice, economic policies are decided through a politi-
cal process. Politics unavoidably affects policy formulation, and an economic 
policy also changes the relative strengths of the different political actors influ-
ential in the process. In this chapter, three questions are highlighted. First, 
why does protection exist? In the politically economy literature, politicians, 
interest groups and voters are the three key politically active players in trade 
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policy formulation. Politicians will consider not only social welfare but also 
their political support when setting trade policy. Interest groups are willing to 
spend money in order to influence policy outcomes through lobbying activities. 
Voters can also express their support through voting. All actors pursue their 
own interests in the policy-making process. That is why protectionism is very 
likely to be selected. Secondly, why do different political actors, for example 
interest groups, have different impacts on policy outcomes? In general, both 
the formation of an interest group and the competition among these groups for 
political influence can determine the capacities for lobbying activities. There-
fore, both the number of firms and the degree of heterogeneity of an interest 
are key factors in determining lobbying performance. Third, why does a spe-
cific policy emerge as a political equilibrium when many policy instruments 
are available? Since tariffs are an important source of tax revenues, which can 
be easily collected, many countries prefer tariffs in the early stage of economic 
development. Once a tariff is established, it is difficult to remove because of 
policy persistence, uncertainty and the necessarily piecemeal nature of reform. 
However, when more policy instruments are available, a government might 
switch to other alternatives. 
40 
Chapter 3 The Lobby-Influence Model 
3.1 Introduction 
In most of the economic literature, policy is assumed to be made by an 
omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent government which seeks to maximize 
social welfare. However, since politics has a significant impact on economic pol-
icy outcomes, the assumption overlooks a crucial aspect of the policy-making 
process (Dixit, 1996). There is a big gap between what economists preach and 
what politicians do. This is particularly true in trade policy (Rodrik, 1995). 
As a result, many researchers incorporate politics through the general equi-
librium framework of the Heckscher-Ohlin model or the specific factor model 
to explain why a government adopts protectionism rather than a free trade 
policy from the political economy of trade policy point of view ( :Nlagee, 1994; 
Helpman, 1997; Riezman and Wilson,1995; Rodrik, 1995). In these research, 
it is generally recognized that policy outcomes are influenced by the lobbying 
expenditure of interest groups in pursuit of their own interests. In other words, 
interest groups can influence the outcomes of the policy-making process and 
therefore lobbying activities need to be included in the analysis. Since inter-
est groups can secure trade protection through lobbying, it is important to 
understand how policy outcomes are influenced by the lobbying expenditure 
of groups seeking to further their own interests. Game theory is a good ana-
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lytical methodology that can be applied to analyze the influences of lobbying 
activity on trade policy and the impact of market condition on the incentives 
of engaging in lobbying. 
A lobbying-influence model in a game theory setting is built in order to 
explain how trade policy is determined in the policy-making process when 
the domestic firms provide lobbying contributions in order to influence the 
outcomes. Suppose that one domestic firm and one foreign firm compete by 
providing outputs for a third market, and that the domestic firm uses lobbying 
contributions to influence export subsidies. A two-stage game is used. At the 
first stage, the firms can choose their lobbying expenditure, and then export 
subsidies are determined. At the second stage, both the domestic and foreign 
firms make their output decisions as Cournot duopolists. The equilibrium re-
sults can be calculated by using a subgame perfect equilibrium concept. In 
the trade theory literature, strategic trade policy has already used game the-
ory as a framework to discuss the implications of trade policy. Brander and 
Spencer (1985) suggest that a welfare-maximizing government will set non-zero 
subsidies in a duopoly market so that social welfare can be increased through 
the profit-shifting. Since trade protection increases the profits of the domestic 
firm, it is quite natural that a self-interested firm will pursue the protection 
benefits even without the actions of a welfare-maximizing government. Baron 
(1997) recognizes that firms can use lobbying strategies to shape the compet-
itive environment linking the interests of firms and policy so that its overall 
performance can be improved. As a result, an export subsidy can not only be 
set by a welfare-maximizing government but can also be obtained by domestic 
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firms through lobbying behaviour. It should be noted that the export subsidies 
are mainly determined by the self-interest firm in the lobbying-influence model 
but are decided by the welfare-maximizing government in the strategic trade 
policy model. 
Several issues are raised by comparing the welfare-maximizing and lobbying-
influence models. First, as the choice between a free trade policy and protec-
tionism lies at the heart of the strategic trade policy literature, we must ask 
what is the policy implication in terms of social welfare and the profits of the 
domestic firm when the lobbying-influencing model is used. Since export sub-
sidies can increase the outputs of the domestic firm, the results suggest that 
the profits of the domestic firm under the welfare-maximizing and lobbying-
influence models are larger than those under the free trade policy. Therefore, 
the domestic firm always has an incentive to engage in lobbying activities in 
order to obtain export subsidies. However, lobbying activities are a kind of 
rent-seeking behaviour and therefore social welfare decreases. The social wel-
fare under the welfare-maximizing and free trade models becomes higher than 
that under lobbying-influencing model. As a consequence, there might be a 
dilemma between the special interests of the domestic firm in terms of profits 
and the general interests in terms of social welfare considerations. When the 
export subsidies are determined by the level of lobbying contributions, protec-
tionism may not be a good policy even in a duopoly market, as is suggested in 
the strategic trade policy literature. Free trade may still remain a good rule 
of thumb in its resistance of the pressure of special interest politics. 
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Secondly, since social welfare under the lobbying-influencing model is not 
always larger than that under the free trade policy, how can social welfare-
decreasing lobbying activities be stopped? In general, there are two possible 
no-lobbying scenarios. On the demand side of trade policy, whether lobbyists 
will lobby or not depends on the benefits and costs of lobbying activities. If the 
costs are greater than the benefits, lobbyists will decide not to offer lobbying 
contributions. On the supply side of trade policy, if the government is unable 
to respond to the lobbying expenditure during policy formulation, there is 
no incentive for the domestic firm to engage in lobbying activities. In other 
words, the impact of lobbying behaviour on the level of protection depends 
on the response of the government. If the government cannot be influenced 
by any lobbying activities, the outcome of trade policy will not be biased. 
Therefore, it is important to know how the government responds in policy-
making to the lobbying contributions when it is no longer assumed to act as 
a benevolent dictator seeking to maximizing social welfare. In this chapter, 
the results suggest that the lobbying influence parameter is the necessary and 
sufficient condition that determines whether lobbying occurs. 
Thirdly, how do market conditions influence the incentives of the domestic 
firm to engage in lobbying activities and therefore the obtained level of export 
subsidies? In the strategic trade policy literature, when the market demand is 
higher and the marginal costs of the domestic firm are lower, the government 
will set a higher export subsidy. In the lobbying-influencing model, the results 
of this chapter suggest that the domestic firm spends more money on lobby-
ing activities when it faces higher market demand and when it is more cost 
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competitive. Therefore, the conditions for the domestic firm to obtain higher 
subsidies are the same as in the welfare-maximizing model. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the ba-
sic model of Brander and Spencer (1985), in which export subsidies are decided 
by a welfare-maximizing government. In section 3.3, a lobbying-influencing 
model is built for a duopolistic market. In order to obtain a higher profit, 
the domestic firm gains lobbying subsidies by offering lobbying contributions. 
In section 3.4, the differences in terms of export subsidies, domestic profits 
and social welfare between the welfare-maximizing and the lobbying-influence 
models are compared. The conclusions are presented in section 3.5. 
3.2 The Welfare-Maximizing Model 
The welfare-maximizing model is the sanle as the Brander and Spencer 
(1985) model of profit-shifting export subsidies. I In a Cournot duopoly 
model, one domestic and one foreign firm export a homogeneous product to a 
third country. The foreign firm has a constant marginal cost c and an exports 
output X2 to the third country. The domestic firm has a constant marginal 
cost c + t and export output Xl to the third country, where t represents cost 
competitiveness. In addition, the marginal costs of firms are assumed to be 
positive, i.e. c > 0 and c + t > O. If the marginal cost of the domestic firm is 
lower than that of the foreign firm, the domestic firm is cost competitive and 
the parameter t is negative. Similarly, if the marginal cost of the domestic firm 
is higher than that of the foreign firm, the domestic firm is less cost competitive 
lCollie (1993) uses a linear demand to discuss the Brander and Spencer model (1985), 
and his method is similar to that used in this section. 
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and the parameter t is positive. 2 Given these assumptions, the welfare of the 
country consists of the producer surplus from exports to the third country, i.e. 
the profits of its firm net of any export subsidy. The domestic government 
is assumed to maximize social welfare WI in order to decide per unit export 
subsidies 81· Similarly, the foreign government is assumed to maximize social 
welfare W2 in order to decide per unit export subsidies 82. The market demand 
in the third country is assumed to be linear and segemented. The price of the 
product in the third country is given by the inverse linear demand function 
P = a - f3(Xl + X2) a, f3 > O. Hence, the profits of the domestic firm and the 
foreign firm are expressed as follows: 
7Tl (1) 
At a Cournot equilibrium, the two firms independently and simultaneously 
choose their outputs to maximize profits, given the export subsidies set by the 
domestic government. Since demand is linear, there exists a unique Cournot 
equilibrium. Assuming that both firms export positive quantities to the third 
market, the first order conditions for a Cournot equilibrium are: 
2The cost competitiveness parameter t is used in order to stress the impact of cost dif-
ference between the domestic firm and the foreign firm on the equilibrium results. If the 
marginal costs of the domestic firm and the foreign firm are Cl and C2, the cost competitive-
ness t is the cost difference between them Cl - C2. If Cl 2:: C2, then t 2:: O. If Cl :=:; C2, then 
t :=:; O. Moreover, the main findings for both settings are the same. 
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These two equations can be solved to obtain explicit solutions for the out-
puts exported by the domestic and foreign firms: 
a - c - 2t + 281 - 82 
3f3 
a - c + t - 81 + 282 
3f3 
(2) 
The welfare of the domestic country is given by the profits of the domestic 
firm net of any export subsidy it receives from the government. Therefore, the 
domestic welfare is given by WI = (7fl - 81Xl) = (P - c - t)Xl. Similarly, the 
foreign welfare is W2 = (7f2 - 82X2) = (P - C)X2. The welfare of both countries 
can be calculated as follows. 
(a - c - 2t + 281 - 82)(a - c - 2t - 81 - 82) 
9f3 
(a - c + t - 81 + 282) (a - c + t - 81 - 82) 
9f3 
(3) 
In the following analysis, we will discuss three possible cases. The first 
is that of a free trade policy with neither the domestic government nor the 
foreign government offering any subsidies. In the second case, only the domes-
tic government will subsidize the domestic firm. Thirdly, both the domestic 
government and the foreign government will subsidize their firms. 
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Free trade policy 
When both the governments adopt a free trade policy, the export subsidies 
are zero. Let the superscript f denote free trade. Then we can obtain the 
outputs of both the domestic firm x{ and the foreign firm x~ under a free 
trade policy from equation (2) as follows. 
x{ a - c - 2t 3{3 (4) 
x~ a-c+t 3{3 
By using the outputs of both the foreign and domestic firms, the profits of 
the domestic firm 7r{ and the profits of the foreign firm 7r~ can be obtained: 
(a - c - 2t)2 
9{3 
(a-c+t)2 
9{3 
(5) 
Similarly, the domestic welfare and the foreign welfare under free trade can 
also be calculated from equation (3) as follows: 
w! 
w! 
(a - c - 2t)2 
9{3 
(a - c + t)2 
9{3 
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(6) 
Domestic export subsidy 
Suppose that only the domestic government uses profit-shifting export sub-
sidies to increase the outputs of its domestic firm while the foreign government 
adopts a free trade policy. Let the superscript u denote the case of domestic 
export subsidies. Therefore, the social welfare of the domestic country can be 
obtained from equation (3) as follows: 
(a - c - 2t + 281) (a - c - 2t - 81) VV~= ------------~~----------~ 9/3 (7) 
Differentiating the domestic welfare with export subsidy 81, the first order 
condition is 8VV1 /881 = a-c-92~-4S) = o. The export subsidy can therefore be 
obtained as follows. 
a - c - 2t u 
8 1 = ----4--- (8) 
In general, the export subsidies are higher if the domestic market demand is 
higher. In addition, the export subsidies are lower if the marginal costs of the 
foreign firm c and the cost competitiveness of the domestic firm t are higher. 
By substituting the export subsidy into equation (2), the optimal output of 
the domestic firm is xl = a-;;;2t and the optimal output of the foreign firm is 
x u = a-c+2t Similarly the profits of both the domestic firm and the foreign 2 4(3· , 
firm can be obtained by substituting the optimal subsidy and the optimal 
outputs of both firms into equation (1). 
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(a - c - 2t)2 
4;3 
(a - c + 2t)2 
16;3 
(9) 
In addition, the social welfare of the domestic country and the foreign 
country can also be calculated as follows. 
W~ 
W2 
(a - c - 2t)2 
8;3 
(a - c + 2t)2 
16;3 
(10) 
Comparing the social welfare between equation (3) and equation (10), the 
social welfare of the domestic country is higher under a unilateral export sub-
sidy than under a free trade policy, i.e. WI > W!. The welfare of the foreign 
country, however, is higher under a free trade policy than under a unilateral 
t b · d . w.! w.u 3 expor su Sl y, I.e. 2 > 2 . 
Export subsidies for both countries 
In this subsection, both the domestic government and the foreign govern-
ment give subsidies to their firms. The two governments independently and 
simultaneously choose their export subsidies in order to maximize their social 
welfare. The superscript s denotes the export subsidies for the two countries. 
By maximizing equation (3), the first order conditions for a Nash equilibrium 
3These result are the same as in Brander and Spencer (1985) and Collie (1993). 
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are 8ws /8s s = a-c-2t-4sj-sz = 0 and 8w.s /8s s = a-c+t-sj-4sz - 0 Th 
1 1 9(3 2 2 9(3 -. e 
optimal subsidy can be obtained by solving these two equations as follows: 
SS a - c - 3t (11 ) 1 5 
SS a - c + 2t 
2 5 
After obtaining the optimal subsidies, the outputs of both the domestic 
firm and the foreign firm can be calculated: 
2(a - c - 3t) 
5(3 
2(a - c + 2t) 
5(3 
(12) 
Then, the profits of both the domestic and foreign firms can be derived as 
follows: 
4(a - c - 3t)2 
25(3 
4(a - c + 2t)2 
25(3 
(13) 
The social welfare of both the domestic country and the foreign country 
can be obtained as: 
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2(a - c - 3t)2 
25{3 
2(a - c + 2t)2 
25{3 
(14) 
We can compare the social welfare between equation (3) and equation (14). 
The welfare of both countries is usually lower if both countries use export 
subsidies than if both countries adopt a free trade policy. That is to say, both 
countries are worse off under the Nash equilibrium than under a free trade 
policy. 4 
3.3 The Lobbying-influence Model 
As pointed out in the previous section, export subsidies can increase the 
profits of the domestic firm in a duopoly market. Perhaps self-interested firms 
will try to act by themselves in order to obtain these protection benefits even 
if there is no welfare-maximizing government to set such a subsidy policy 
automatically. Since export subsidies are determined in the political policy-
making process, these firms can engage in lobbying activities in order to obtain 
subsidies so that their profits can be increased. As a result, we focus on how a 
firm can influence policy outcomes through strategic lobbying activities in an 
export subsidy model. 
A two-stage game is used. At the second stage, both the domestic and 
foreign firms compete in outputs as Cournot duopolists in the third market. 
At the first stage, the domestic firm decides its lobbying contributions in order 
4For the details, see also Collie (1993). 
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to get lobbying subsidies so that its profits are maximized. Suppose that the 
export subsidies s(l) are determined by lobbying contributions l offered by the 
domestic firm. In general, the higher the lobbying contributions l, the higher 
the export subsidies s. That is to say, the relationship between an export 
subsidy and a lobbying contribution is a~~l) > O. When the domestic firm 
spend more money on lobbying activity, the benefits from lobbying activity 
in terms of export subsides should be increased. Otherwise, no firm would 
like to offer lobbying contribution. Moreover, the marginal return of lobbying 
activities is assumed to be decreasing. When the domestic firm spends more 
money on lobbying, the marginal export subsidy obtained by the domestic 
firm is decreasing, i.e. a~~~l) < O. In other words, when the domestic firm 
offers more lobbying contribution, the total export subsidies are higher but the 
increased level of subsidy become lower. 5 For simplicity, the export subsidies 
are assumed to take the functional form of s(l) = kl 1/ 2 , where k is the lobbying 
influence parameter. 6 That is to say, the domestic firm is paying lobbying 
contribution l in order to lower its own costs by getting export subsidies kl 1/ 2 . 
Note that the specific lobbying subsidy function satisfies the above generally 
. d t·· as(l) - k 0 d a2 s(l) - ....:=!£. < 0 M b requIre proper 1es. az - 2P/2 > an az2 - 413 / 2 • oreover, y 
using the specific function setting, we can compare the differences between the 
lobbying-influencing and welfare-maximizing models more easily. 
Three cases of lobbying-influence model are discussed in this section. First 
5The same assumptions of the lobbying subsidies function s(l) are also made in Moore 
and Suranovic (1993); Long and Soubeyran (1996) and Pecorino (1998). 
GIf the lobbying subsidies function is assumed to be s(l) = kl, the equilibrium outputs of 
the domestic fum depend only on the lobbying-influencing parameter k, not on any market 
demand parameters a and f3 in this model. That is, xt = 43k' Therefore, we only discuss 
the case of marginal returns to lobbying decreasing. 
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of all, there are no lobbying activities. In this case, the outputs and the profits 
of the domestic firm and the foreign firm are equal to those in the free trade 
policy. Domestic welfare and foreign welfare are also the same. Therefore, 
we do not repeat the calculations in this section. Secondly, only the domestic 
firm contributes lobbying money in order to gain a subsidy. Thirdly, both the 
domestic and the foreign firms offer lobbying contributions in order to obtain 
lobbying subsidies from their own governments. 
Domestic lobbying subsidy 
Suppose that only the domestic firm engages in lobbying activities. Let the 
superscript d denote the case of a domestic lobbying subsidy. The domestic 
firm is assumed to spend lobbying contribution h and hence obtains subsidies 
s = k1 li/ 2 . Therefore, the profits of both the domestic and foreign firms are as 
follows: 
7rd 1 (15) 
In order to obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium, we solve this game back-
wards. At the second stage, two firms independently and simultaneously 
choose their outputs to maxirnize their profits. Since demand is linear, there 
exists a unique Cournot-N ash equilibrium. Assuming that both firms export 
positive quantities to the third market, the first order conditions are as follows: 
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Therefore, the outputs of the domestic firm and foreign firms can be ob-
tained by solving the above two equations: 
(a - c - 2t + 2k1h1/2) 
3{3 
(a - c + t - k1h 1/2) 
3{3 
(16) 
By substituting the outputs of both the domestic and foreign firms into 
equation (15), the profits of the domestic firm can be calculated as follows: 
At the first stage, the domestic firm chooses its lobbying contributions in 
order to maximize its profits. Maximizing the domestic profits with respect 
to lobbying contributions, the optimal lobbying contribution and the implied 
export subsidy are given as follows: 
h 
4k~(a - c - 2t)2 (17) (9{3 - 4ki)2 
Sd k l 1/2 - 2k~(a - c - 2t) (18) 1 1 1 - 9{3 - 4ki 
Substituting equation (16) with the above lobbying contribution and export 
subsidies, the optimal outputs of both domestic and foreign firms are obtained 
as follows: 
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3(a - c - 2t) 
9,8 - 4kr 
3,8(a - c + t) - 2ki(a - c) 
,8(9,8 - 4ki) 
(19) 
Note that the lobbying-influence parameter is non-negative, i.e. kl > O. 
When the lobbying-influence parameter kl = 0, the outputs of both the do-
mestic and foreign firms in equation (19) are equal to the outputs under the free 
trade policy in equation (12) That is x d = a-c-2t = xf and x d = a-c+t = xf 
. '1 3(3 1 2 3(3 2 . 
Since the outputs of firms under the free trade policy is non-negative, we can 
ensure that a - c - 2t > O. 
Lemma 1: The positive outputs of the domestic firm and the foreign firm 
require 0 < kl < 3(3(a-c+t) 2(a-c) . 
Proof: 
(1) xt > 0 requires that (a - c - 2t) > 0 and 9,8 - 4ki > O. 
(2) x~ > 0 requires that 9,8 - 4ki > 0 and 3,8(a - c + t) - 2ki(a - c) > o. 
Since a - c - 2t > 0 the conditions which satisfy the positive outputs are 
- , 
as follows. 
xf > 0, i = 1,2 
{:} 9,8 - 4ki > 0,3,8(a - c+t) - 2kUa - c) > 0 
9 4 34 (a-c+t) o < k2 < _fJ 0 < k2 < _fJ-----'-__ --:--_ 
{:} - 1 - 4' - 1 - 2(a - c) 
2 3,8(a-c+t) < 9,8 
{:} 0 < kl < ( ) - -4 2a-c 
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3jJ(a-c+t) 
( ) (J.~.IJ. 2a-c 
Note that the condition 3jJ(a - c + t) - 2ki(a - c) > 0 is more likely to 
hold if kl is smaller and the value of this expression is monotonic in k1 . More--
over, if both the domestic and foreign firms have the same marginal costs, the 
cost competitiveness t = O. The above condition for positive outputs of the 
domestic and foreign firms reduces to 0 < kl < j¥. 
Proposition 1: The lobbying contribution (lobbying subsidy) increases with 
the market demand and the lobbying influence parameter, and decreases with 
the marginal cost of the foreign nrm and cost competitiveness. Moreover, 
the sufficient and necessary condition for the domestic nrm not to spend any 
lobbying money is kl = O. 
Proof: 
. . f h . 11 bb . t 'b t' l 4k?(a-c-2t)2 The comparative statIcs 0 t e optima 0 ylng con n u IOn 1 = (9,B-4ki)2 
are as follows: 
Bft (8ki) (a - c - 2t) > 0 
Ba (9jJ - 4ki)2 
Bft -(8ki)(a - c - 2t) < 0 
Bc (9jJ - 4ki)2 
Bft -(16ki)(a - c - 2t) < 0 
Bt (9jJ - 4ki)2 
Bft 8k1 (9jJ + 4ki)(a - c - 2t)2 > 0 
Bkl (9jJ - 4ki)3 
Similarly, since st sign( g~) for an 
variable v. 
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If kl = 0, then h = 0, so that kl = ° is the sufficient condition for no 
10 b bying contribution. Since (a - c + 2t) =I- ° and (9,B - 4kD =I- 0, if h = 0, then 
the necessary condition for no lobbying is kl = 0. Therefore, the sufficient and 
necessary condition for no lobbying contribution is that the lobbying influence 
parameter is zero. Q.E.D. 
From proposition 1, the only case in which the domestic firm does not en-
gage in lobbying activity is that the lobbying contribution does not have any 
impact on the outcome of the policy-making process. If the government can 
be influenced by lobbying contributions and therefore decides to set a lobbying 
subsidy, the optimal response for the domestic firm is to engage in lobbying 
activities so that its profits are maximized. Moreover, if the lobbying influence 
parameter is higher, the lobbying expenditure should also be higher. That is to 
say, the domestic firm would like to make a higher lobbying contribution if the 
domestic government can be influenced easily and therefore sets higher lobby-
ing subsidies. Similarly, if the market demand is higher, the profits increased 
by subsidies are higher, so that more lobbying contributions are offered by the 
domestic firm. Moreover, when the domestic firm is more cost competitive, 
it can benefit more from subsidies because more profits are shifted from the 
foreign firm. In other words, if the domestic firm has higher marginal costs 
than those of the foreign firm, the domestic firm will spend less on lobbying 
activities. If the foreign firm has higher marginal costs than those of the do-
mestic firm, the domestic will increase its lobbying expenditure in order to 
gain higher subsidies. 
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In addition, social welfare is equal to the profits of the firm net of any 
export subsidies. Therefore, the domestic welfare can be written as WId = 
(7ft - kll~/2xt) = (a - {3(xt + x~) - c - t)xt and the foreign welfare is wt = 
(7fg) = (a-{3(xt+x~)-c)x~. The profits and social welfare of both the domestic 
and foreign firms can be obtained by substituting the lobbying contribution of 
equation (17) and the outputs of equation (19). 
7fd 
I 
(a - c - 2t)2 
9{3 - 4ki 
(3{3(a - c + t) - 2k?(a - C))2 
{3(9{3 - 4ki)2 
(9{3 - lOkI) (a - c - 2t)2 
(9{3 - 4kt)2 
(3{3(a - c + t) - 2k?(a - C))2 
{3(9{3 - 4ki)2 
(20) 
(21) 
Proposition 2: 1Vhen the lobbying influence parameter is higher, the profits 
of the domestic firm are higher but the social welfare of the domestic country 
is lower. If kl = 0, the domestic profits are at the lowest level, and the social 
welfare is at its highest level. 
Proof: 
Differentiating the profits of the domestic firm and the social welfare with 
respect to the lobbying influence parameter, we can obtain: 
8kl (a-c-2t)2 > 0 
(9{3 - 4kf)2 -
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Since 0 < kl < 3,6i(:~c~t), the higher kl' the higher 1ft and the lower wt. 
When k = 0 d = (a-c-2t)2 and W d = (a-c-2t)2 QED 1 , 1f 1 9,6 1 9,6·· . . 
Proposition 2 shows that the profits of the domestic firm increase since it 
can use its lobbying contributions to gain lobbying subsidies, thus shifting the 
profits from the foreign firm to the domestic firm. The higher the lobbying in-
fluence parameter, the higher the lobbying subsidies and the greater the shifted 
profits. When the lobbying influence parameter kl is zero, the domestic firm 
gets zero lobbying subsidies, so that its profits are the lowest. Furthermore, 
since lobbying costs are dead weight loss, the social welfare of the domestic 
country decreases. The higher the lobbying influence parameter, the greater 
the lobbying expenditure and the lower the social welfare. As a result, the 
export subsidies increase domestic profits through the profit-shifting effect but 
decrease social welfare because of the dead-weight loss. There is a dilemma 
when the domestic firm engages in lobbying activities. As a consequence, if the 
lobbying influence parameter is zero, no lobbying contribution will be offered 
and the social welfare is the highest. If the lobbying influence parameter is 
not zero, the domestic firm has an incentive to engage in lobbying activities so 
that its profits are higher but the social welfare is lower. 
Lobbying subsidies for both countries 
Suppose that both the domestic and foreign firms would like to offer lobby-
ing contributions in order to gain export subsidies. The superscript b denotes 
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export subsidies for both countries. The profits of the domestic and foreign 
firms are represented as follows: 
(22) 
Maximizing the profits of the domestic and foreign firms, the first order 
conditions are as follows: 
Therefore, the outputs of the domestic firm and the foreign firm can be 
obtained by solving these two equations: 
(a - c - 2t + 2kll~1/2 - k2l~1/2) 
3(3 
(a - c + t - kll~1/2 + 2k2l~1/2) 
3(3 
(23) 
At the first stage, the profits of the domestic and foreign firms, obtained 
by using equation (24), are maximized simultaneously. The optimal lobbying 
contribution and the optimal export subsidies are as follows: 
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4ki(3f3(a - c - 2t) - 2k~(a - c - t))2 
(27132 - 12f3(kr + k~) + 4krk~)2 
4k~(3f3(a - c + t) - 2ki(a - C))2 
(27132 - 12f3(kr + k~) + 4krk~)2 
2ki(3f3(a - c - 2t) - 2k~(a - c - t)) 
(27132 - 12f3( kr + k~) + 4kr k~) 
2k~(3f3(a - c + t) - 2ki(a - C)) 
(27132 - 12f3(kr + kD + 4krk~) 
(24) 
(25) 
The outputs of the domestic and foreign firms can be obtained by substi-
tuting the optimal lobbying contribution: 
3(3f3(a - c - 2t) - 2k~(a - c - t)) 
(27132 - 12f3(kr + k~) + 4krk~) 
3(3f3(a - c + t) - 2ki(a - c)) 
(27132 - 12f3(k1 + k2) + 4krk~) 
(26) 
Lemma 2: The positive outputs of the domestic and foreign firms require 
3f3(a-c+t) i = 1 2 
2(a-c) ' ,. 
Proof: 
(l)x~ > 0 requires 3f3(a - c - 2t) - 2k~(a - c - t) > 0 and (27f32 - 12f3(k1 + 
k2) + 4kik~) > O. 
(2)x~ > requires 3f3(a - c - 2t) - 2ki(a - c - t) > 0 and (27132 - 12f3(k1 + 
k2) + 4kik~) > O. 
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Therefore, the positive outputs of both firms require the following condi-
tions. 
xf > 0, i = 1,2 
~ (3jJ(a - c+t) - 2k;(a - c)) > O,i = 1,2 
<> 0 < k < 3,6(0< - C + t) < J9,6 . - 1 2 QED 
. 2(a-c) - 4,2-, ... 
Moreover, the profits of the domestic and foreign firms can be calculated 
by substituting equation (26) into (23) as follows: 
7rb I 
(913 - 4ki)(3jJ(a - c - 2t) - 2k~(a - c - t))2 
(27132 - 12jJ( ki + k~) + 4ki k~)2 
(913 - 4k~)(3jJ(a - c + t) - 2ki(a - c))2 
(27132 - 12jJ(ki + kn + 4kfk~)2 
(27) 
Similarly, the social welfare levels of the domestic and foreign countries are 
as follows: 
(913 - lOki) (3jJ(a - c - 2t) - 2k~(a - c - t))2 
(27132 - 12jJ(ki + k~) + 4kik~)2 
(913 - 10k~)(3jJ(a - c + t) - 2kHa - C))2 
(27132 - 12jJ(ki + k~) + 4kik~)2 
(28) 
When the lobbying-influence pararneter kl = k2 = 0, the equilibrium results 
should be the same as those under the free trade policy. That is, the outputs of 
. . fir b (a-c-2t) f d b _ (a-c+t) _ f the domestIc and foreIgn ms are Xl = 3{3 = Xl an x 2 - 3{3 - X2· 
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The profits of the domestic and foreign firms are 7rb = (a-c-2t)2 = 7rI! and 1 9(3 
b _ (a-c+t)2 _ ! Th '" 7r 2 - 9(3 - 7r 2 . e welfare of the domestIc and foreIgn countnes are 
W b = (a-c-2t)2 = W! d w.b - (a-c+t)2 - w.f 
1 9(3 1 an 2 - 9(3 - 2 . 
Proposition 3: When the cost competitiveness parameter of the domestic 
firm is higher, the domestic lobbying contribution, the profits of the domestic 
firm, and the social welfare of the domestic country are lower. 
Proof 
Differentiating equations (24), (27) and (28), the comparative statics of the 
lobbying contribution, the profits, and the social welfare with respect to cost 
competitiveness are as follows: 
al~ 16ki(3{3 - k~)(3{3(a - c - 2t) - 2k~(a - c - t)) 
at - (27{32 - 12{3(kr + k§) + 4krk§)2 < 0 
a7rf -4(3{3 - k~)(9{3 - 4ki)(3{3(a - c - 2t) - 2k~(a - c - t)) 
at (27 {32 - 12{3( kr + k§) + 4kr k§)2 < 0 
aWf -4(3{3 - k~)(9{3 - 10kf) (3{3(a - c - 2t) - 2k~(a - c - t)) 
at (27{32 - 12{3(kr + k§) + 4krk§)2 < 0 Q.E.D. 
When the cost competitiveness parameter is higher, the marginal costs 
of the domestic firm are also higher and therefore the profit-shifting effect is 
lower. As a result, the incentive for the domestic firm to engage in lobbying 
activities is lower, so that the lobbying contribution offered by the domestic 
firm is also lower. Moreover, if the lobbying contribution is lower, the export 
subsidies obtained by the domestic firm are lower, so that the profits of the 
domestic firm are also lower. Since the profits of the domestic firm is part of 
the social welfare of the domestic country, the lower the domestic profits, the 
64 
lower the social welfare. In other words, the domestic firm will spend more 
money on lobbying activities if the domestic firm has lower marginal costs 
than those of the foreign firm. If the domestic firm is more cost competitive, 
the profit-shifting effect through export subsidy is stronger, and therefore the 
profits of the domestic firm and the social welfare of the domestic country are 
higher. 
3.4 Comparison 
In this section, we compare the results of applying the welfare-maximizing 
model and the lobbying-influencing model, in terms of the profits of the do-
mestic firm, and the welfare of the domestic country. Two criteria are used. 
First of all, the equivalent export subsidies: when the welfare subsidies and 
the lobbying subsidies are the same, what is the ranking of social welfare and 
the profits of the domestic firm for the two models? Only the case in which the 
domestic firm alone is given subsidies is analyzed. If both the domestic and 
foreign firms are given subsidies, the conditions for both firms to obtain the 
same subsidies are different. Therefore, we do not discuss this case here. Sec-
ondly, the optimal export subsidies criteria: when the optimal export subsidies 
are calculated from the welfare-maximizing and lobbying-influencing models, 
what is the ranking of social welfare and the profits of the domestic firm? 
Equivalent export subsidies 
Lemma 3: When the lobbying-influence parameter kl 
subsidy s'1 and the lobbying subsidy sf are equivalent. 
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/¥' the welfare 
Proof: 
¢} 
u d 
8 1 = 8 1 
2ki (a - c - 2t) a - c - 2t 
9/3 - 4kf 4 
¢} 12ki(a - c - 2t) = 9/3(a - c - 2t) 
k2 _ 3/3 ¢} 1-
4 
¢'} kJ = J3: Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4: When the welfare subsidy is equal to the lobbying subsidy, the 
ranking of the pront of the domestic nrm is best-worst: the welfare-maximizing 
model, the lobbying-influencing model and the free trade model. 
Proof: 
When k1 = /¥-' the profits of the domestic firm are 1ft = (a-~~2t)2. There-
fore, the difference in the profits of the domestic firm among models is calcu-
lated as follows: 
-,-(a __ c_2---,t)_2 _ (a - c - 2t)2 > 0 
4/3 6~-
(a - c - 2t) 2 (a - c - 2t) 2 
-'--------'- - > 0 
6/3 9/3-
Proposition 4 is quite intuitive. Since the export subsidies obtained by the 
domestic firm under both models are equal, the effect of profit-shifting is the 
same. However, the donlestic firm has to spend a certain amount on lobbying 
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to get the lobbying subsides. As a result, the profits of the domestic firm 
under the welfare-maximizing model are larger than those under the lobbying-
influencing model. In addition, if the benefits of lobbying are not larger than 
the costs of lobbying, the domestic firm will not have any incentive to engage 
in lobbying activities. Therefore, the profits of the domestic firm under the 
lobbying-influencing model are higher than those under the free trade policy. 
Accordingly, the profits of the domestic firm under the welfare-maximizing 
model are the highest and the profits of the domestic firm under the free trade 
model are the lowest. 
Proposition 5: lVhen the welfare subsidy is equal to the lobbying subsidy, 
the ranking of the social welfare of the domestic country is the best-worst: the 
welfare-maximizing model, the free trade model and the lobbying-influencing 
model. 
Proof: 
When kl = jF!, the social welfare of the domestic country is Wld = 
(a-c-2t? Therefore the differences in the social welfare of the domestic coun-24,8 . , 
try among the models are calculated as follows: 
W u_Wd 1 1 
wt-W! 
W~-W! 
(a - c - 2t) 2 (a - c - 2t) 2 0 ~--------- > 8~ 24~-
(a - c - 2t) 2 _ (a - c - 2t) 2 < 0 
24~ 9~-
(a - c - 2t)2 _ (a - c - 2t)2 > 0 
8~ 9~-
Therefore, WI > W! > wf. Q.E.D. 
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As pointed out by Brander and Spencer (1985), the welfare under the 
welfare-maximizing model is higher than that under the free trade policy be-
cause of the profit-shifting effect. Although profits-shifting effects exists in 
the lobbying-influencing model, the domestic firm has to offer lobbying contri-
but ions in order to obtain export subsidies. Lobbying expenditure is a dead 
weight loss. As a result, the social welfare of the domestic country under 
the lobbying-influencing model is lower than that under the free trade pol-
icy. Moreover, the export subsidies obtained by the domestic firm under the 
welfare-maximizing model and the lobbying-influencing model are equal. In 
this case, the effects of profit-shifting are the same but lobbying expenditure 
decreases social welfare. Therefore, the social welfare of the domestic country 
under the welfare-maximizing model is larger than that under the lobbying-
influencing model. Accordingly, the social welfare of the domestic country 
under the welfare-maximizing model is the highest and the social welfare of 
the domestic country under the lobbying-influencing model is the lowest. 
The optimal export subsidies 
Proposition 6: When only the domestic firm can obtain export subsidies, 
Proof: 
The subsidy difference is calculated as follows: 
u d 3(3,8 - 4ki)(a - c) 
~81 = 8 1 - 8 1 = 4(9,8 - 4kf) 
Therefore, ~81 > 0 requires (3,8 - 4ki) > O. Q.E.D. 
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From proposition 6, when the export subsidy is given only to the domestic 
firm, a welfare subsidy is larger than a lobbying subsidy if 3f3 - 4k2 > o. 
Otherwise, if 3f3 - 4k2 < 0, then the lobbying subsidy is higher than the 
welfare subsidy. Moreover, a welfare subsidy is more likely to be the larger if 
the value of the lobbying influence parameter is smaller. When the lobbying 
influence parameter k = 0, the subsidy difference is .6.81 = Ck4C > O. In other 
words, when the government is easily influenced by the lobbying contribution, 
the lobbying subsidy is more likely to be larger than the welfare subsidy. 
Proposition 7: When the export subsidy is only given to the domestic firm, 
whether the profits of the domestic firm under the welfare-maximizing model 
are larger than that under lobbying-infiuencing model depends on the sign of 
5{3 - 4k2 . Moreover, the profits of the domestic firm under both the welfare-
maximizing model and the lobbying-infiuence model are higher than those 
under the free trade model. 
Proof: 
The differences in the profits of the domestic firm are as follows: 
(5f3 - 4k2)(a - c - 2t)2 
4f3(9f3 - 4k2) 
5 (a - c - 2t) 2 > 0 
36f3 -
4k2(a - c - 2t)2 > 0 
9f3(9f3 - 4k2) -
Therefore, (7f1- 7ft) > 0 requires 5f3 - 4k2 > O. Q.E.D. 
Although export subsides can shift the profits of the domestic firm, the 
domestic firm has to engage in lobbying activities in order to obtain lobbying 
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subsidies. Therefore, the profits-shifting effect and the costs of lobbying activ-
ities drive the compartive results of the profits of the domestic firm among the 
models. It is quite clear that the domestic profits under the welfare-maximizing 
model would be larger than the profits of the domestic firm in the free trade 
case. Moreover, the domestic firm would like to engage in lobbying activities 
only if its profits increase so that the profits of the domestic firm under the 
lobbying-influencing model are higher than those under the free trade model. 
As a result, the profits of the domestic firm under the free trade policy are the 
lowest. Moreover, when the lobbying influence parameter is large enough and 
the lobbying subsidies are higher than the welfare subsidies, the profits under 
the lobbying-influencing model are likely to be higher than those under the 
welfare-maximizing model. 
Proposition 8: VVhen only the domestic firm is given export subsides, the 
ranking of the social welfare of the domestic country among models is the best-
worst: the welfare-maximizing model, the free trade model and the lobbying-
influence mode1. 
Proof: 
The social welfare difference can be calculated as follows: 
W u_wd 1 1 
w~-w! 
wt-w! 
(9f32 + 8f3k2 + 16k4 )(a - c - 2t)2 > 0 
8f3(9f3 - 4k2)2 -
-'-( a __ c_2_t )_2 > 0 
72f3 -
-2k2(9f3 + 8k2)(a - c - 2t)2 < 0 
9f3(9f3 - 4k2)2 -
Therefore, WI > W! > wt· Q.E.D. 
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Export subsidies can increase the profits of the domestic firm through the 
profit-shifting effect. Since the profit of the domestic firm is part of the social 
welfare, the social welfare level under the welfare-maximizing model is greater 
than the social welfare level under a free trade policy. However, the domestic 
firm has to spend lobbying expenditure in order to get the lobbying subsidies 
and the lobbying contribution is a kind of dead weight loss. As a result, the 
social welfare under the welfare-maximizing model is larger than that under 
the lobbying-influencing model. Similarly, the social welfare under the free 
trade is also higher than those under the lobbying-influencing model. The 
social welfare of the domestic country under the lobbying-influencing model is 
the lowest. 
To sum up, if the export subsidies are determined by the level of lobbying 
contribution, the profit of the domestic firm under the lobbying-influence model 
is higher than those of free trade policy. Therefore, the domestic firm always 
has an incentive to engage in lobbying activities in order to obtain lobbying 
subsidies. Unfortunately, the social welfare of the domestic country decreases 
when lobbying activities occur. Since lobbying expenditure is a kind of dead 
weight loss, the social welfare of the domestic country under the lobbying-
influencing model is lower than those of free trade policy. As a result, there is 
a conflict between the special interests of the domestic firm in terms of profits 
and the general interests in terms of welfare. An export subsidy may not 
improve social welfare even in a duopoly market as is suggested in the strategic 
trade policy literature. 7 Free trade still rernains a good rule of thumb as it 
7Moore and Suranovic (1993) also suggest that a subsidy is not a good policy if lobh',ing 
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resists the pressure of special interest politics in the full information situation. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In order to understand how lobbying activities can influence the outcome 
of trade policy-making, this chapter builds a political economy of trade policy 
model which incorporates lobbying in a duopoly market when information 
is complete. The results suggest that the lobbying subsidies are higher if 
the market demand is higher and the marginal cost of the domestic firm is 
lower. Moreover, the incentives of the domestic firm to engage in lobbying 
activities are greater if the lobbying influence parameter is higher. When 
the lobbying influence parameter is equal to zero, the lobbying subsidies are 
always zero, irrespective of the lobbying contribution offered by the domestic 
firm. Therefore, the domestic firm would not engage in any lobbying activity. 
However, if the lobbying influence parameter is not equal to zero, the domestic 
firm will undertake lobbying activities and thus increase its profits. In addition, 
the comparison between welfare-maximizing and lobbying-influencing models 
is made in order to appreciate the differences between them. Since export 
subsidies can shift the outputs of the domestic firm in a duopoly market, the 
profits of the domestic firm are higher under the export subsidies policy than 
those under the free trade policy. As a result, the domestic firm achieves the 
lowest profits if the free trade policy is adopted. The lobbying contribution is 
a kind of dead weight loss and therefore social welfare decreases. The ranking 
of social welfare of the domestic country among models is the best-worst: 
the welfare-maximizing model, free trade policy and the lobbying-influencing 
is incorporated. 
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model. 
In addition, many export-oriented countries use a subsidy policy to help 
their firms compete in the international market. If the export subsidies are 
determined by the level of lobbying contribution, there are some testable hy-
pothesis as follows. (1) The more efficient industries will lobby more in order 
to obtain higher export subsidies. (2) The industries have higher incentive to 
engage in lobbying activities if market demand is larger. (3) More lobbying 
contributions are offered by the industries if the lobbying influence parameter 
is higher. Nevertheless, when the domestic firm engages in lobbying activities, 
the social costs exceeds the social benefits of lobbying behaviour. Although 
lobbying subsidies increase the profits of the domestic firm, the social welfare of 
the domestic countries under lobbying subsidies is still lower than those under 
free trade policy in a duopoly market. Free trade rather than protectionism is a 
better policy from the view point of social welfare, in contrast to the results of 
Brander and Spencer (1985). Under these circumstances, a country should set 
a zero lobbying influence parameter so that the level of lobbying contribution 
does not have any impact on export subsidies. Thus, the welfare-decreasing 
lobbying activities can be stopped. 
The lobbying-influencing model is built in a game theory framework and 
therefore is quite useful for analyzing the strategic role of behaviours and 
provides some useful insights. Although the specific lobbying subsidies func-
tional form s(l) = kl 1/ 2 is used, the function satisfies the general properties 
of ~: > 0 and ~~~ < o. That is, a positive relationship exists between export 
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subsidies and lobbying contributions, and the export subsidies exhibits a de-
creasing return to the lobbying contribution. Under these circumstances, the 
sign of comparative statics of lobbying contribution is the same as the sign of 
comparative statics of export subsidies, irrespective of the special functional 
form. In addition, the special function has an advantage of bringing specific 
equilibrium results so that we can compare the difference between welfare-
maximizing and lobbying-influence models. Nevertheless, the results obtained 
from the lobbying-influence model are sensitive to competition assumptions as 
those strategic trade policy models. In other words, if firms are assumed to 
compete as Bertrand rather than Cournot duopolists, the results are not ro-
bust. Moreover, the domestic government is quite passive in this model. That 
is to say, the model does not consider the supply side of trade policy and only 
uses the lobbying influence parameter to express the responses of the govern-
ment. Since the lobbying influence parameter is determined by the political 
system, different political systems yield different lobbying-subsidies functions. 
More research specifying the political mechanisms, such as legislative organi-
zation, is required, combining both the supply side and demand side of trade 
policy in the policy-making process. 
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Chapter 4 Signalling and Asymmetric 
Lobbying 
4.1 Introduction 
Since policy outcomes are influenced by the lobbying activities of interest 
groups in pursuit of their own interests, much work has focused on explanations 
of how organized interest groups can secure trade protection through lobbying 
activities (Brainard and Verdid, 1994; Findly and Wellisz, 1982; Grossman 
and Helpman, 1994; Moore and Suranovic, 1993; Ras mus en , 1993). However, 
the levels of protection obtained by each interest group are different. This 
gives rise to an important question: why do different interest groups have 
different impacts on policy outcomes? On the one hand, the formation of an 
interest group can influence its lobbying ability. Olson (1965) suggests that 
the number of firms is a key determinant of the organizational power of an 
interest group, because this affects the ability to overcome free rider problems. 
However, Pecorino (1998) argues that the ability to receive protection through 
lobbying activities does not necessarily become more difficult as the number 
of firms in the industry rises. At the same time, Long and Souberyran (1996) 
show that the degree of heterogeneity of an interest group is a key factor which 
determines lobbying performance. On the other hand, the competition among 
interest groups also influences the results of lobbying activities. Becker (1983, 
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1985) argues that the structure of protection obtained by each interest group 
is determined by the competition outcomes among interest groups for political 
influence. Nevertheless, the external environment, such as market demand 
and cost competitiveness, also has an impact on lobbying results, but this 
aspect is neglected in the literature. For example, when domestic firms face 
different levels of market demand or have different levels of international cost 
competitiveness, the incentives for the domestic firms to seek trade protection 
are different. In other words, as the external environment faced by interest 
groups varies, the incentive to engage in lobbying activities also varies so that 
the outcomes of lobbying activities are different. In this chapter, we focus on 
the issue of how asymmetric lobbying is determined by cost competitiveness 
in both complete and incomplete information structures. 
Suppose that one foreign firm and one domestic firm export a homogenous 
product to a third country. Export subsidies, which are determined by the 
level of lobbying contribution, are adopted in order to help the domestic firm 
compete internationally. The actions of firms are assumed to follow two stages. 
In the first stage, the domestic firm chooses its lobbying expenditure and then 
the lobbying subsidies are obtained. In the second stage, both domestic and 
foreign firms compete in outputs as Cournot duopolists in the third market. In 
addition, we incorporate incomplete information of cost competitiveness into 
the model. Suppose that the cost competitiveness of the domestic firm has only 
two types: either high or low. This is private information to the domestic firm 
and is unknown to the foreign firm. However, it is common knowledge to both 
firms. If the domestic firm offers separate lobbying contribution according 
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to its true type of cost competitiveness, the private information of its cost 
competitiveness is therefore revealed. It is possible for the foreign firm to infer 
the type of cost competitiveness of the domestic firm by observing the levels of 
lobbying contribution in the first stage. Otherwise, if the domestic firm offers a 
uniform lobbying contribution, irrespective of the type of cost competitiveness, 
the private information of cost competitiveness remains still unknown to the 
foreign firm. 
In the complete information case, the optimal lobbying contribution can be 
derived by using a subgame perfect equilibrium concept. The results suggest 
that the domestic firm spends more money on lobbying activities when the 
lobbying influence parameter of the domestic government is higher, when the 
demand of the third market is higher, and when the domestic firm is more 
cost competitive. In the incomplete information case, the results show that 
both separating and pooling equilibria can be found in the model but only 
separating equilibrium is self-enforcing. At the separating equilibrium, the 
domestic firm offers the full information lobbying contribution when its cost 
competitiveness is of the high type. When the cost competitiveness is of the 
low type, the domestic firm has to spend more on lobbying in order to signal its 
cost competitiveness to the foreign firm. Therefore, the profits of the domestic 
firm are lower than those in the full information case. To sum up, whether the 
information on cost competitiveness is complete or incomplete, the lobbying 
contributions offered by the domestic firm is determined by its level of cost 
competitiveness. In other words, the incentive of the domestic firm to engage in 
lobbying activities varies with its cost competitiveness. Different competitive 
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environments induce different incentives for the domestic firm to offer lobbying 
contribution. When export subsidies are determined by the level of lobbying 
contribution, the level of export subsidies obtained by the domestic firm varies 
because the level of cost competitiveness is different. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 sets out 
the basic framework when the domestic firm engages in lobbying activities in 
order to get export subsidies. Under the full information case, a subgame 
perfect equilibrium is used to solve the optimal lobbying contribution and out-
puts of both firms. Section 4.3 incorporates the incomplete information of 
cost competitiveness parameter into the model, and the existence and unique-
ness of a separating equilibrium is discussed. In section 4.4, the domestic firm 
uses pooling equilibrium to decides its lobbying decision, and therefore the 
true information of cost competitiveness cannot be revealed. Both separating 
and pooling equilibrium are compared in order to determine the equilibrium 
choice of the domestic firm under condition of incomplete information. Brief 
concluding remarks appear in section 4.5. 
4.2 The Basic Model 
Suppose that one foreign firm and one domestic firm export a homogeneous 
product to the third market. An export subsidy policy is used to help the do-
mestic firm to compete in the international market. The level of export subsidy 
is determined by the amount of lobbying contribution offered by the domestic 
firm in the policy-making process. For simplicity, assume that the lobbying 
subsidy is determined by the lobbying contribution and takes the functional 
78 
form of s(l) = kl l / 2 , where k is the lobbying influence parameter. A two-stage 
game is used. In the first lobbying stage, the domestic firm decides its opti-
mal lobbying contribution in order to maximize its profits. Once the optimal 
lobbying contribution is determined, the lobbying subsidy is obtained. In the 
second output competition stage, both the domestic and foreign firms compete 
on outputs as Cournot duopolists in the third market. In addition, suppose 
that the marginal costs of the foreign firm are c and the marginal costs of the 
domestic firm are c + t, where t represents the cost competitiveness parameter. 
When incomplete information over the cost competitiveness parameter is in-
corporated into the model, only the domestic firm is assumed to have private 
information about its cost competitiveness. However, it is common knowledge 
that cost competitiveness parameter ti has two types: either the high type th or 
the low type tl, with probability Prob(ti = th ) = A. If the cost competitiveness 
is of the high type, the domestic firm has higher marginal costs and is less cost 
competitive. If the cost competitiveness is of the low type, the domestic firm 
has lower marginal costs and is more cost competitive. Therefore, the profits 
of the domestic firm 1T"1 (Xl, X2) and the profits of the foreign firm 1T"2(XI, X2) can 
be written as follows: 
1T"1(XI,X2) 
1T"2(XI,X2) 
(a - (3(XI + X2) - c - t + kll/2)XI -l 
E[(a - (3(XI + X2) - C)X2 Il] 
(1) 
At the second stage, both the domestic and foreign firms compete as 
Cournot duopolists. Let E(XI Il) be the conditional expectation of the foreign 
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firm concerning the outputs of the domestic firm Xl, given the level of lobbying 
contribution offered by the domestic firm. Maximizing the profits of both the 
domestic and foreign firms, the first order condition is obtained as follows: 
a - 2(3XI - (3X2 - C - t + kll/2 = 0 
Moreover, information concerning cost competitiveness is private to the 
domestic firm and therefore is unknown to the foreign firm. Suppose that 
the foreign firm uses the lobbying contribution which is observed at the first 
stage to infer the type of cost competitiveness. The foreign firm believes that 
the type of cost competitiveness is tj = E(t I l), which mayor may not be 
consistent with the true type of cost competitiveness of the domestic firm ti . 
Hence, the foreign firm can construct its expectation at the best reply of the 
domestic firm, i.e. E(XI Il) = (a-f3X2-~~ti+kll/2). Combining this and the first 
order condition of the foreign firm, the optimal outputs of both the domestic 
and foreign firms can be calculated as follows. 
ex - c + 2kl l/2 _ 3ti+tj 
2 
3(3 
a - c - kl l / 2 + tj 
3(3 
(2) 
Substituting the outputs of both the domestic and foreign firms into equa-
tion (1), the profits of the domestic firm 7r1(ti, t j ), which depend on both the 
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true type of cost competitiveness ti and the foreign firm's beliefs about cost 
competitiveness t j , are as follows: 
(3) 
Let lobbying contribution l(ti' tj) be the unique maximizer of 7rl(ti, t j ). 
Therefore, the optimal lobbying contribution can be calculated by different i-
ating the profits of the domestic firm as follows: 
k( 3ti+t") l (t" t") = [2 a - c - ~ ] 2 
t, J 9(3 _ 4k2 (4) 
Full information case 
In this subsection, the special case of full information of cost competitive-
ness is considered. Assume that the foreign firm knows the true type of cost 
competitiveness of the domestic firm. That is to say, when the cost competi-
tiveness of the domestic firm is ti, the foreign firm's belief about cost competi-
tiveness is also t i . As a result, the profits of the domestic firm can be obtained 
from equations (3) as follows: 
(5) 
Similarly, the first best lobbying contribution can be obtained as follows: 
_ [2k(a - c - 2ti)]2 
If- 9(3-4k2 (6) 
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In fact, the optimal lobbying contribution under the full information case 
l f is the same as equation (18) in chapter 3. If we differentiate the lobbying 
contribution according to the market demand, the lobbying influence parame-
ter, and the cost competitiveness, the results of the comparative statics are 
the same as proposition 1 in chapter 3. When market demand and lobbying 
influence parameter are higher, the incentive for the domestic firm to engage 
in lobbying activities is greater, i.e. 8l f l8a > 0 and 8l f l8k > o. However, 
the comparative statics of the lobbying contribution to the cost competitive-
ness parameter shows a negative relation, i.e. 8l f 18ti < o. When the cost 
competitiveness parameter ti is larger, the marginal costs of the domestic firm 
are higher and therefore the level of lobbying contribution is lower. Similarly, 
when the cost competitiveness parameter ti is smaller, the domestic firm has 
lower marginal costs and therefore the level of lobbying contribution is higher. 
As a result, when the information of cost competitiveness parameter is incom-
plete, it is very likely that the more cost competitive domestic firm has higher 
incentives to engage in lobbying activities in a separating equilibrium in order 
to signal its true type. 
4.3 Signalling Equilibrium 
In this section, separating equilibrium is discussed when the incomplete in-
formation over cost competitiveness is incorporated into the model. Suppose 
that the optimal lobbying contribution of the high type is lh and the optimal 
lobbying contribution of the low type is ll. The posterior belief of the foreign 
firm about cost competitiveness depends on the level of lobbying contribution. 
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That is, prob(tj = t h ) = )"(I). The existence of separating equilibrium requires 
the following conditions (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Overgaard, 1993). First of 
all, the strategy of each type of domestic firm is sequentially rational at the 
separating equilibrium. The domestic firm chooses its optimal lobbying contri-
bution according to its private information of cost competitiveness, given the 
beliefs of the foreign firm about cost competitiveness. Secondly, the foreign 
firm's belief about cost competitiveness are consistent at the separating equi-
librium. Therefore, we can write the following three possibilities if the belief 
is consistent. 
(1) If Ih -; Ii, then )..(lh) = 1 and ),,(Il) = o. If the lobbying contributions of 
the high and low types are different, the foreign firm can form its belief 
according to the level of the optimal lobbying contribution offered by the 
domestic firm. When the optimal lobbying contribution is Ij, the foreign 
firm believes that the true type of cost competitiveness of the domestic 
firm is t j . 
(2) If Ih = ll' then )..(lh) = )... When the lobbying contribution for both the 
high and low types are the same, the posterior belief of the foreign firm 
about cost competitiveness is the same as prior belief )... 
(3) If l -; lh' ll' then any belief )"(l) E [0,1] is consistent. When the lobbying 
contributions are not separating equilibrium strategies, any belief about 
cost competitiveness is assured for the foreign firm. 
Thirdly, weakly dominated strategies are eliminated. The foreign firm 
should rule out the possibilities that the domestic firm chooses a dominated 
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lobbying strategy. That is to say, if the lobbying contribution offered by the 
domestic firm is dominated for the low type but not for the high type, then the 
foreign firm believes that the cost competitiveness is high type. Conversely, if 
the lobbying contribution offered by the domestic firm is dominated only for 
the high type but not for the low type, then the foreign firm believes that the 
cost competitiveness is of the low type. 
As a result, the separating equilibrium are lh -=1= II and )"(lh) = 1, )"(ll) = o. 
In general, the higher the marginal costs of the domestic firm and the higher 
the cost competitiveness according to the foreign firm's belief, the lower the 
profits of the domestic firm. When information is incomplete, the domestic 
firm prefers to signal that its cost competitiveness is of the low type, no matter 
which type it actually is. Therefore, the domestic firm of the high type with 
marginal costs c + th is the worst type. When the cost competitiveness of 
the domestic firm is of the high type, and the foreign firm also believes the 
marginal costs of the domestic firm are of the high type, then the lobbying 
contribution lh is the same as in the full information case: If· The profit 
7[l(lf, th, th) is the highest. Any lobbying contribution l deviating from the 
full information lobbying contribution decreases profits. That is, 7[l(l, th, t h) < 
7[l(lf, th, th), Vl -=1= If. Moreover, the domestic firm of the low type with 
marginal costs C+tl would like to offer a higher lobbying contribution ll' which 
can signal to the foreign firm that its cost competitiveness is of the low type. 
Otherwise, if the lobbying contribution l -=1= ll' then the foreign firm would like 
to believe that the cost competitiveness of the domestic firm is of the high 
type. 
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Incentive-compatibility conditions 
Given the above beliefs, does (If' ll) constitute a separating equilibrium? 
The results depend on whether incentive-compatibility conditions are satisfied 
or not. Suppose that the domestic firm is of the high type, if the foreign firm 
also believes that cost competitiveness is of the high type, then the profits of 
the domestic firm are denoted by 7r 1 ( t h, t h)' If the foreign firm believes that cost 
competitiveness is of the low type, then the profits of the domestic firm become 
7rl(th, tl)' Similarly, when the domestic firm is of the low type, if the foreign 
firm also believes that the cost competitiveness is of the low type, then the 
domestic profits can be written as 7rl (tl' tl)' If the foreign firm believes that cost 
competitiveness is of the high type, then the profits of the domestic firm are 
7rl (tl' th)' As a result, the existence of a separating equilibrium requires that the 
following incentive-compatible conditions hold: 7rl(ti, t i ) > 7rl(ti, tj). In other 
words, if the cost competitiveness of the domestic firm is of the high type th, 
then the domestic firm would rather not contribute lobbying expenditure ll' 
irrespective of how the foreign firm interprets this. If the cost competitiveness 
of the domestic firm is of the low type t l , then the domestic firm would prefer 
to choose lobbying contribution II in order to persuade the foreign firm that 
the domestic firm is of the low type. That is, 
7rl(th,th) 
7rl(tl,tl) 
7rl(th,tl) > 0 
7rl (tl' th) > 0 
(1) The high type firm has no incentive to pretend to be of the low type. 
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It is unprofitable for the high type firm to pretend to be the low type instead 
of choosing its full information lobbying contribution l f and be recognized. Let 
Lh be the set containing lobbying contributions which satisfy the incentive-
Even if the foreign firm believes that the cost competitiveness of the domestic 
firm is of the low type, the profits of the domestic firm of the high type are 
higher if it provides lobbying contribution If. 
(a - c - 2th + 2kl}i2)2 
9{3 - If 
( 2t (4k2)(a-c-2th ))2 a -- c - h + 9j3-4k2 2k(a - c - 2th) 2 
9{3 - [ 9{3 - 4k2 ] 
(a - c - 2th)2 
9{3 - 4k2 
(a - c + 2kl//2 _ 3tb+tl)2 
> 7rl(th, tl) = 9{3 2 - II 
(2) The low type has no incentive to deviate its equilibrium strategy. 
It is unprofitable for the low type domestic firm to deviate its lobbying 
contribution II to the lobbying contribution l(tl,th), given that the foreign 
firm believes that cost competitiveness is of the high type. Let Ll be the 
set containing lobbying contributions which satisfy the incentive-compatible 
domestic firm of the low type is believed to be of the high type, the optimal 
lobbying contribution can be obtained by maximizing its profits 7rl (tl' th)' That 
tb +3t1 
is, l(tl' th) = [2k(a;;-=-4k22 )]2. The profits of the domestic firm of the low type 
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are higher if it abides by its lobbying strategy ll' given the foreign firm's beliefs 
about the type of the cost competitiveness. 
(ex - c - 2tl + 2kli/2)1/2 
9f3 - II 
(a - c + 2kl(tl' th)1/2 _ th~3tl)2 
> 7rl(tl,th)= 9f3 -l(tl,th) 
(a-c-~)2 
9f3 - 4k2 
Existence of separating equilibrium 
When separating equilibrium exists, the equilibrium strategies are lh = If 
and II E Lh n Ll, and the equilibrium beliefs are A(ll) = 0 and A(l) = 1, Vl E 
R \ {ll}. If the domestic firm chooses its lobbying contribution ll' then the 
foreign firm believes that the domestic firm is of the low type. Otherwise, 
the foreign firm believes that the domestic firm is of the high type. In the 
following, we want to know whether the set Lh n Ll exists or not. In addition, 
if the set Lh n Ll is non-empty, is it possible to get a unique undominated 
separating equilibrium? 
. (a-c-~ +2kl1 / 2)2 First of all, define functIOn F(l) = 7rl (th' t l) - 7rl (th' th) = [ ~13-
l] - (a;;~;~~? When the incentive compatible condition for the high type 
is satisfied, the function F(l) is non-positive. Since the profits 7rl(th, th) are 
fixed, the function F(l) has the highest value if the profits of the domestic 
firm 7rl (th' tl) are the lowest. As a result, the lobbying contribution can be 
calculated as l(th' tl) = [2k~;=~~2~1)]2 and the value of the function F(l(th' t l)) = 
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(a-c-elJ~-=-~~;-C-2th)2 > O. The lobbying contribution l(th' t l) is not in the set of 
separating equilibrium for the high type Lh. If the equality holds such that 
F(l) = 0, the lobbying contribution can be solved as IFl and IF2. The set 
of lobbying contributions, which satisfy the incentive-compatible condition for 
Secondly, define function G(l) = 7rl(tl, tl) - 7rl(tl, th) = [(a-c-2t~;2kll/2)2 -
I] - (a9~~~t~)2. When the incentive-compatible condition for the low type is 
satisfied, the function G(l) is non-negative. Since the profits of the domestic 
firm 7rl(tZ, th) are fixed, the function G(l) has the highest value if the profits 
of the domestic firm 7rl(tl, tz) are the highest. Therefore, we can calculate 
the lobbying contribution l(tz, tz) = [2k~~-=-~~;tl)F and the value of the function 
G(l(t t )) (a-c-2tl)2_(a-C-eh)2 > 0 The 10bbYl'ng contrl'butl'on l(t t) l'S at z, l = 9f3-4k2' Z, Z 
the set of separating equilibrium for the low type. If the equality holds such 
that G(l) = 0, the lobbying contribution can be solved as ICI and IC2. The set 
of lobbying contributions, which satisfy the incentive compatible-condition for 
the low type, is Ll = {illci < I < IC2}' 
As a result, the separating equilibrium strategies for the low type are lobby-
ing contributions I satisfying F(l) < 0 and G(l) > O. That is, l E Lh n LZ. The 
lobbying contribution I is in the set of {IF2 < I <lc2}' Therefore, the least 
cost separating equilibrium for the low type can be found when lobbying con-
tribution lz = IF2' As stated above, the lobbying contribution IF2 can obtained 
b I · F(l) - [(a-c- e1 +2kZ1 / 2)2 - I] - (a-c- 2th)2 = 0 That is the lobbying y so vlng - 9f3 9f3-4k2 " 
J 7th+tl 2k(a-c-6)+3 (th-tl)(a-c- 4 ) 2 . contribution is lF2 = [ 9f3-4k2 ] • When the domestic firm 
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is of the low type and the foreign firm believes that the cost competitiveness is 
of the low type, the profit of the domestic firm at the separating equilibrium 
. (t t) - (a-C- 2tl+2kl¥22)2 l 
IS 7rl l, l - 9f3 - F2 
Proposition 1: There exists a unique un dominated separating equilibrium 
The lobbying contribution of the low type at the separating equilibrium is 
higher than that of full information so that signalling is costly and lobbying 
contribution distorted upwards. That is, lF2 > l(tl' tl). As a result, the profit of 
the domestic firm under separating equilibrium is also lower than that under 
the full information case. In addition, the lobbying contribution l(tz, tz) is 
not in the set of incentive-compatibility conditions for the high type Lh, i.e. 
l (tl' tz) tf. Lh. Otherwise, there is no adverse selection and hence no signalling 
problems exists. That is to say, when the lobbying contribution is l(tz, tz), the 
incentive-compatible condition of the high type does not hold as follows. 
7rl (th' th) - 7rl (th' tz) 
( c 4k2 (a-c-2t l »)2 ) (0: - C - 2th)2 0: - C - I"Z + (9f3- 4k2 ) + [2k(0: - C - 2tz ]2 
9(3 - 4k2 9(3 (9(3 - 4k2) 
(0: - C - 2th)2 1 3(tz - th) 9(3 ( )]2 [2k( a - c - 2tZ)]2 
-'------:-- - - [ + 0: - C - 2tl + 9(3 - 4k2 9(3 2 9(3 - 4k2 9fJ - 4k2 
(0: - C - 2th)2 (9(3 - 4k2)(a - c - 2tZ)2 + 3(0: - C - 2tZ)(tl - th) + (tl - th)2 
9(3 - 4k2 (9(3 - 4k2)2 9(3 - 4k2 9(3 
[(0: - C - 2th)2 - (0: - C - 2tZ)2 + 3(th - tz)(o: - c - 2tl)] _ (th - tZ)2 
9(3 - 4k2 9(3 
(th - tz)(o: - c - 4th + 2tl) _ (th - tl)2 < 0 
4k2 - 9(3 9(3 -
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4.4 Pooling Equilibrium 
For the game of incomplete information over cost competitiveness described 
in the previous section, the domestic firm of the low type has to spend more 
money on lobbying activities in order to convince the foreign firm that its cost 
competitiveness is low type. Hence, signalling through the level of lobbying 
contribution is costly. Under these circumstances, pooling equilibrium may be 
used to avoid separation. At the pooling equilibrium, the domestic firm decides 
to use a uniform lobbying contribution I to lobby the domestic government, no 
matter which type it actually is. Therefore, the foreign firm still does not know 
the true type of the domestic firm since no information of cost competitiveness 
is revealed. The posterior belief of the foreign firm on cost competitiveness 
remains the same as the prior belief, i.e., Pro(ti = th) = )..(I) = )... The foreign 
firm takes the cost competitiveness of the domestic firm to be t = )..th+(l-)..)tz. 
In addition, if the domestic firm is of the high type, the profit of the domestic 
firm at the pooling equilibrium is 7r1(th, t). If the domestic firm is of the low 
type, the profit of the domestic firm at the pooling equilibrium is 7r1 (tz, t). 
Incentive compatible conditions 
Suppose that the pooling lobbying contribution is I. If the lobbying contri-
bution is different from the pooling equilibrium I, the out of equilibrium belief 
is assumed to be that costs of the high type. In other words, when the cost 
competitiveness of the domestic firm is of the high type, the belief of the for-
eign firm is high type. When the cost competitiveness of the domestic firm is 
of the low type, the belief of the foreign firm should also be high type for con-
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sistency. The existence of the pooling equilibrium requires that the following 
incentive-compatibility conditions hold. 
(l)The high type prefers not to deviate pooling. 
When cost competitiveness is of the high type, the profits of the domes-
tic firm at the pooling equilibrium are higher than those at separating 
equilibrium. Let Hh be the set containing the lobbying contribution 
where the domestic firm of the high type prefers pooling equilibrium I to 
7rl(th, I) > 7rl(th, th) 
(a - c + 2kI1/ 2 - 3th2+t)2 _ 
~ -l 
9(3 
> (a - c + 2kl1/ 2 - 3thith )2 _ l 
9(3 
(2) The low type prefers not to deviate pooling. 
(7) 
When the cost competitiveness is of the low type, the profits of the 
domestic firm at the pooling equilibrium are higher than those at the 
separating equilibrium. Let Hl be the set containing lobbying contribu-
tion where the domestic firm of low type prefers pooling equilibrium l to 
(8) 
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When the pooling equilibrium exists, the equilibrium lobbying contribution 
must satisfy the condition: I E Hh n Hl. 
Proposition 2: Any lobbying contribution I E Hh n Hl can be sustained as 
an undominated pooling equilibrium. 
Proof: 
The incentive compatible conditions are as follows. 
(a - c + 2kl1/ 2 - 3thith )2 
9(3 -l 
(a - c + 2kl1/ 2 _ ~ )2 
9{3 -l 
Since t < th 3t;+I < 3ti+th where i = h l As a result, the above incentive 
'2 2' , . 
compatible conditions can be satisfied if lobbying contribution I = I + 8, where 
8 ~ o. Therefore, the set I E Hh n Hl is not empty. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2 shows that there exists some pooling lobbying contribution 
I, which satisfies the incentive-compatible conditions for both types. However, 
if the pooling equilibrium is refined, the above belief is shown inconsistent in 
the following subsection. 
Refinement of equilibrium 
Following Cho and Kreps (1987), a self-enforcing equilibrium requires the 
elimination of equilibrium dominated strategies. That is, the domestic firm 
prefers a higher payoff in equilibrium. 
Proposition 3: No self-enforcing pooling equilibrium exists. 
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Proof: 
A potential candidate for a self-enforcing pooling lobbying contribution 
must be in the set of Hh n Hl. Fixing any pooling equilibrium I E Hh n HZ, we 
can find a lobbying contribution ld = I + E, where E ~ 0 such that the following 
two conditions hold. 
3t - (o:-c-2tz+2kldl/2)2 l (o:-c- 3t12+t +2kll/2)2 (1) Since 2tl < z2+t , - > - - I. 9{3 - d - 9{3 
(2) S· 2t > 3t b+t (o:-c-2th+2klY2? _ l < (o:-c- 3t~+t +2kll/2)2 Ince h 2' 9{3 d _ 9{3 - l. 
It is profitable for the low type to deviate from pooling equilibrium but 
not for the high type. Therefore, no self-enforcing pooling equilibrium ex-
ists.Q.E.D. 
When the domestic firm offers lobbying contribution ld, the profits of the 
domestic firm under the pooling contribution I are lower than those under the 
lobbying contribution ld. Therefore, the lobbying contribution ld is a domi-
nated strategy for the high type but not for the low type. Since the domestic 
firm can obtain higher profit if it deviates from the pooling equilibrium, the 
lobbying contribution ld destabilizes the pooling equilibrium. As a result, the 
pooling equilibrium is not self-enforcing. In addition, when both the separat-
ing equilibrium and pooling equilibrium exist, the domestic firm would like to 
use the separating equilibrium rather than the pooling equilibrium. The sep-
arating equilibrium is the refined equilibrium and is adopted by the domestic 
firm. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This paper suggests that cost competitiveness can influence the incentives 
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of the domestic firm to engage in lobbying activities so that asymmetric lob-
bying is observed. When the information of cost competitiveness is complete, 
if the marginal costs of the domestic firm is higher, the domestic firm would 
offer a lower lobbying contribution and therefore export subsidies are lower. 
When the information of cost competitiveness is incomplete, both the separat-
ing equilibrium and pooling equilibrium can be found but only the separating 
equilibrium is self-enforcing. At the separating equilibrium, the belief of the 
foreign firm on the type of cost competitiveness is determined by the level of 
lobbying contribution offered by the domestic firm. When cost competitiveness 
is high type, the domestic firm offers full information lobbying contribution. 
When cost competitiveness is low type, the lobbying contribution is higher 
than the full information case in order to signal the foreign firm about its low 
type. As a result, the level of lobbying contribution offered by the domestic 
firm varies according to the level of its cost competitiveness in both complete 
and incomplete information cases. Since the incentives of the domestic firm 
to engage in lobbying activities vary with its cost competitiveness, the policy 
outcomes of lobbying are different. 
The special lobbying subsidies function is also used in this chapter. When 
the information is incomplete, this setting can explain the strategic role of lob-
bying behaviour more easily by calculating specific equilibrium lobbying con-
tributions. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the level of market demand 
and the lobbying influence parameter are also determinants of asymmetric lob-
bying in the full information case. If the information on these variables are 
incomplete, more research should be undertaken in order to get a complete 
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than if not. In the next chapter, we will discuss further the welfare effect 
of lobbying activities in a two-period model when potential foreign entry is 
considered. 
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Chapter 5 Signalling, Free Entry and 
Asymmetric Lobbying 
5.1 Introduction 
It is generally recognized that lobbying activities are a kind of rent-seeking 
behaviour and lobbying expenditure is dead weight loss. Therefore, social 
welfare decreases if lobbying occurs (Krueger, 1974; Bhagwati, 1982). However, 
when information concerning the industry is incomplete, the informed firm can 
provide information about industry through lobbying in the policy-making 
process. As a consequence, social welfare might be increased (Austen-Smith, 
1990; Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1994). There is a positive role for lobbying 
activities. In the public choice literature, Rasmusen (1993), Lohmann (1995) 
and Largerlof (1997) have investigated the welfare effect of lobbying behaviour 
in an incomplete information setting. However, their models do not discuss 
the possibility of potential entry. The actual or potential threat of foreign 
competition is important in the international market. As a result, we discuss 
the issue of positive role of lobbying activity in an incomplete information 
structure when the potential entry of the foreign firm is incorporated. 
A two-period lobbying-influence model with entry is used. Suppose that one 
domestic monopoly firm and one potential foreign entrant are in the market. 
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In the first period, the domestic firm decides its optimal lobbying contribution 
and outputs. In the second period, the foreign firm makes its entry decision 
and then both the domestic and foreign firms choose their outputs. Assume 
that the entry decision of the foreign firm is based on its profits, which depend 
on the level of cost competitiveness of the domestic firm. In the full information 
case, when the cost competitiveness is of the high type, the foreign firm will 
enter the market because its profits are positive after entry. Both the domestic 
and foreign firms compete as Cournot duopolists in the market. When the cost 
competitiveness is of the low type, the foreign firm will stay outside the market 
because its profits are negative after entry. The domestic firm still remains as 
a monopoly. No mistake about entry decision can be made by the foreign firm 
when information is complete. The optimal lobbying contribution is zero for 
the domestic firm of both types. 
However, when the information of cost competitiveness is incomplete and 
unknown to the foreign firm, it is possible that the foreign firm makes a wrong 
decision about entry. That is to say, when the cost competitiveness of the 
domestic firm is low type, the foreign firm enters the market and achieves neg-
ative profits; or when the cost competitiveness of the domestic firm is high 
type, the foreign firm stays outside the market and does not make any positive 
profits. Under this circumstances, the domestic firm can engage in lobbying 
activities so that the private information of cost competitiveness can be re-
vealed to the foreign firm and helps the foreign firm to make right decision of 
entry. 
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Nevertheless, the domestic firm will not necessarily offer lohhying contri-
bution according to its true type of cost competitiveness and might like to 
influence tlw belief of the foreign firm in order to deter entry. The results of 
this chapter suggest that both separat.ing equilibrium and pooling equilibrium 
can be found. In the separating equilibrium, the incentive of the domestic firm 
to engage in lobbying is based on its cost competitiveness. The domestic firm 
will not provide any lobbying cont.ribution when the cost compet.itivcmess is of 
the high type; and will offer a positive amount of lobbying contribution when 
the cost competitiveness is of the low type. In the pooling equilibriuIll, the 
domestic firm will offer a zero lobbying contribution, which is the same a.-.; ill 
the full information case. In addition, if the expected profits of the foreign firm 
after entry is negative, the pooling equilibrium is the refined equilibrium. Oth-
erwise. the separating equilibrium is the refined equilibrium. Howc~ver, social 
welfare under the pooling equilibrium is higher than that under the separatillg 
equilibrium. There is no positive role for lobbying activity wlwn t.he pot.cnt.ial 
foreign entry is incorporated, so lobbying activit.ies should be banned. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 5.2, a two 
period model with potential foreign entry is built under a complet.e information 
setting. Section 5.3 discusses the existence of separating equilibriulll wlwn tlw 
information over cost. competitiveness is incomplete. The role of a lobbying 
contribut.ion is like burning money to signal the true t.ype of cost. compd.i-
tivcncss of the domestic firm. Section 5.4 examines the exist.cnce of a pooling 
equilibriuIll. Since both t.he separating cquilibrium and the pooling (~qllilih­
rimll can be found, the refinemcnt of equilibrium and the cOIllparisoll of social 
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welfare are analyzed. Brief concluding remarks appear in the final section 5.5. 
5.2 The Basic Model Under Complete Information 
Suppose that one domestic firm exports output to the third country and 
one foreign firm decides whether to enter the market or not. 1 A two-period 
lobbying-influence model is used. In the first period, the domestic firm chooses 
its optimal monopoly outputs. In the second period, the foreign firm decides 
whether to enter the market or not. If the foreign firm enters the market, both 
the domestic and foreign firms produce a homogeneous product and compete 
in terms of outputs as Cournot duopolists. If the foreign firm stays outside the 
market, the domestic firm remains a monopoly in the second period. Assume 
that the market demand is a linear function of total outputs X in the market, 
where P = a - {3X a, {3 > O. In the first period, the total outputs X is 
the monopoly outputs of the domestic firm xi. In the second period, the total 
outputs X is the sum of both outputs of the domestic firm xi and the outputs 
of the foreign firm x~ . Note that the output x~ is zero if the foreign firm decides 
not to enter the market. In addition, assume that the marginal costs of the 
foreign firm are c and the cost of the foreign firm sunk to enter the market is F. 
The marginal costs of the domestic firm are c + t, where t represents the cost 
competitiveness. When the cost competitiveness parameter is positive, the 
marginal cost of the domestic firm are higher than that of the foreign firm and 
therefore it is less cost competitive. Similarly, when the cost competitiveness 
parameter is negative, the marginal costs of the domestic firm is lower than 
1 In order to be consistent with the previous chapters, we assume that firms compete in 
the third market. However, the reasoning used in this chapter still hold if firms compete 
with each other in the domestic market. 
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that of the foreign firm and therefore is more cost competitive. As a result, 
the profits of the domestic firm in the first period 1r{ and the profits of the 
domestic and foreign firms in the second period 1ri and 1r~ are as follows. 
1rUxi) = (a - jJx~ - c - t)x~ (1) 
(a - jJ(xi + x~) - c - t)xi (2) 
(a - j3(xi + x~) - c)x~ - F 
When the information over cost competitiveness is complete, the entry 
decision of the foreign firm is therefore based on its profits after entering the 
market, which depends on the type of cost competitiveness of the domestic 
firm. The profits of the foreign firm in the second period are always non-
negative. No mistake about entry is possible. If the profits of the foreign firm 
after entry are positive, the foreign firm will enter the market. If the profits of 
the foreign firm after entry are negative, the foreign firm will stay outside the 
market. 
The foreign firm enters the domestic market 
In the second period, if the foreign firm did enter the market, the outputs 
and profits of both firms can be calculated as follows. Maximizing the profits 
of both the domestic and foreign firms, the first order conditions are 
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- 2{3xi - {3x~ + a - c - t = 0 
- {3xi -- 2{3x~ + a - c = 0 
The above two equations can be solved simultaneously and the outputs of 
the domestic and foreign firms can be obtained as xi = a-3
ci 2t and x~ = a-;~+t. 
Substituting the outputs into equation (2), the profits of the domestic and 
foreign firms in the second period are derived as follows. 
1T2 
1 
(a - c - 2t)2 
9{3 
(a - c + t)2 _ F 
9{3 
(3) 
Lemma 1: The foreign firm will enter the market if and only ift > 3v'1JF -
(a - c). 
Proof: 
The foreign firm decides to enter the market if its profits are positive. 
2 = (a - c + t)2 _ F > 0 
1T2 9{3 -
{:} (a - c + t)2 > 9(3F 
{:} a - c + t > V9(3F 
{:} t>3V(3F-(a-c) 
That is, 1T~ > 0 {:} t > 3y'7JF - (a - c). Q.E.D. 
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The foreign firm will enter the market if its profit is positive; and will 
stay outside the market if its profit is negative. In other words, if the cost 
competitiveness of the domestic firm satisfies the condition t > 3J{3F-(ex-c), 
the foreign firm will enter the market. The cost competitiveness is denoted 
as high type tho In this case, the domestic firm and the foreign firm compete 
with each other as Cournot duopoly in the market. The profits of the domestic 
and foreign firms in the second period are written as 7rih and 7r~h' If the cost 
competitiveness of the domestic firm satisfies the condition t < 3J {3F - (ex - c), 
the foreign firm will stay outside the market. The cost competitiveness is 
denoted as low type tl. In this case, the domestic firm remains a monopoly in 
the market. The profits of the domestic and foreign firms in the second period 
. 2 d 2 are wntten as 7r 1l an 7r 2l' 
The foreign firm stays outside the market 
If the foreign firm stays outside the market, the outputs and profits of 
the foreign firm in the second period are zero. The outputs and profits of 
the domestic firm in the second period are the same as those of the domestic 
firm in the first period. As a result, we only need to calculate both outputs 
and profits of the domestic firm in the first period. Maximizing the profits 
of the domestic monopoly firm in the first period, the first order condition 
is ex - c - t - 2{3xi = O. The outputs of the domestic firm can be solved 
as xi = a2~-t. Substituting the outputs into equation (1), the profits of the 
domestic firm are as follows: 
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7r1 1 
(a-c-t)2 
4,8 
(a-c-tz)2 
4,8 
(4) 
When information is incomplete, the profits of the domestic and foreign 
firms in both periods are summarized as follows. 
(1) The first period profits 
1 (a-c-t)2 
7rl = 
(2) The second period profits 
High cost competitiveness 
Low cost competitiveness 
5.3 Separating Equilibrium 
4,8 
(a - c - 2th)2 
9,8 
(a - c + th)2 _ F 
9,8 
o 
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The incomplete information over cost competitiveness is incorporated into 
the model in this section. Assume that the information on cost competitive-
ness of the domestic firm is incomplete and is unknown to the foreign firm. 
Only the domestic firm has the private information on its cost competitive-
ness. However, it is a common knowledge that the cost competitiveness of the 
domestic firm has two types, either high type th or low type tl, with probability 
pTob(t = th) = A. When the cost competitiveness is high type, if the foreign 
firm enters the market in the second period, the profit of the foreign firm is 
positive. When the cost competitiveness is of the low type, if the foreign firm 
enters the market in the second period, the profit of the foreign firm is nega-
tive. Irrespective of the type of cost competitiveness, if the foreign firm stays 
outside the market, the profit of the foreign firm are always zero. As a result, 
there is no guarantee that the profits of the foreign firms is non-negative. It 
is possible that the foreign firm makes a wrong decision about entry since the 
information on cost competitiveness is incomplete. In other words, when the 
cost competitiveness of the domestic firm is of the low type, the foreign firm 
enters the market and achieves negative profits; or when the cost competitive-
ness of the domestic firm is of the high type, the foreign firm stays outside the 
market and does not make any positive profits. 
Under these circumstances, the domestic firm has an incentive to offer 
lobbying contribution lj, which may not be consistent with its true type of 
cost competitiveness t i , in order to influence the belief of the foreign firm 
and therefore deter entry. In other words, assume that the entry decision 
of the foreign firm depends on its belief about the cost competitiveness of 
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the domestic firm, and that the belief is influenced by the level of lobbying 
contribution offered by the domestic firm in the first period. Irrespective of the 
type of cost competitiveness of the domestic firm, the profits of the domestic 
firm are always higher if the foreign firm stays outside the market. It is clear 
that the domestic firm always prefers to be a monopoly rather than a duopoly 
in the second period. As a consequence, the domestic firm of both types has 
an incentive to engage in lobbying activities when information is incomplete. 
If the foreign firm believes that the cost competitiveness of the domestic firm 
is of the low type, entry is deterred and the profits of the domestic firm is 
increased. Therefore, the profit of both the domestic and foreign firms in both 
periods can be written as follows. 
if enters market 
if stays outside 
(5) 
(6) 
It should be noted that the outputs of the domestic firm in the first period 
can also be used as a signal to reveal the private information on cost com-
petitiveness to the uninformed foreign firm. However, there is no distortion 
in the product market if the lobbying contribution is used. Lobbying contri-
bution is a better revealing mechanism than the outputs of the domestic firm 
. Therefore, lobbying contributions work as a signal to influence the belief 
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of the foreign firm about the type of cost competitiveness. In addition, since 
there is no foreign firm in the market in the first period, no profit-shifting 
subsidy is really obtained through lobbying activities. The role of lobbying 
contribution is analogous to burning money to signal its private information 
of the domestic firm. Moreover, following Milgram and Robert (1982) 2, the 
foreign firm learns the true type of the cost competitiveness of the domestic 
firm immediately, after making its entry decision based on its belief. 
Suppose that the monopoly profits of the domestic firm in the first period 
7fim is equal to the profits of the domestic firm under full information case 
minus the lobbying contribution, i.e. 7fIm = 7fI -lj. If the foreign firm believes 
that the cost competitiveness is low type and do not enter the market, the 
monopoly profits of the domestic firm in the second period is 7frm. If the 
foreign firm believes that the cost competitiveness is high type and enters the 
market, the duopoly profits of the domestic and foreign firms in the second 
period are 7frd and 7f~d. According to the entry decision of the foreign firm, 
the profits of both the domestic and foreign firms can be calculated as those 
in the last section. We can summarize the profits of the domestic and foreign 
firms in both periods as follows. 
(1) The first period profits 
(2) The second period profits 
2See also in Tirole (1989), The Theory of Industrial Organization, P367-371. 
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The foreign firm enters the market 
(a - c - 2ti)2 
9{3 
(a - c + ti )2 
9{3 - F 
The foreign firm stays outside the market 
o 
Incentive compatibility conditions 
As pointed out, the domestic firm can influence the belief and therefore the 
entry decision of the foreign firm by engaging in lobbying activities in order 
to increase its profits. Nevertheless, a rational foreign entrant, knowing that 
it is in the self interest of the domestic firm to lie about its true type of cost 
competitiveness, may not believe the revealed information. As a result, is it 
possible for the foreign firm to know the true type of cost competitiveness and 
to make the right entry decision according to the level of lobbying contribution 
offered by the domestic firm in the first period? 
The incentive of the domestic firm to offer lobbying contribution varies with 
its cost competitiveness. The higher the cost competitiveness of the domestic 
firm, the lower the benefits of remaining a monopoly. As a consequence, the 
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domestic firm of high cost competitiveness is the worst type and has less in-
centive to engage in lobbying activities. When the cost competitiveness is of 
the high type, the domestic firm would like to choose a zero lobbying contri-
bution, i.e. lh = 0, which is the same as the full information case. When the 
zero lobbying contribution is observed, the foreign firm will believe that the 
cost competitiveness of the domestic firm is of the high type and will enter 
the domestic market. Any positive lobbying contribution deviating from the 
zero lobbying contribution only decreases the profits of the domestic firm of 
the high type. Similarly, when the cost competitiveness is of the low type, 
the domestic firm would like to offer a positive lobbying contribution li' which 
maximizes its profits. When lobbying contribution li is observed, the foreign 
firm would like to believe that the cost competitiveness of the domestic firm 
is of the low type and stays outside the market. Moreover, if lobbying contri-
bution l -=1= li' the cost competitiveness of the domestic firm is believed to be 
of the high type, and the foreign firm will enter the domestic market. 
Given the above beliefs, does (lh' Ii) constitute a separating equilibrium? 
The results depend on whether incentive compatibility conditions are satisfied 
or not. In other words, the domestic firm of low cost competitiveness does not 
want to pick the lobbying contribution of high type, and vice versa. 
(1) The high type has no incentive to pretend to be the low type. 
When the cost competitiveness is of the high type, it is unprofitable 
for the domestic firm to offer lobbying contribution Ii relative to choose 
the full information lobbying contribution Ih = 0 and be recognized. 
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Let Lh be the set of containing lobbying contributions which satisf,v 
the incentive-compatibility condition for the high type. That is, Lh = 
7rim(th, Ih) + 7riAth) > 7rim(th, Iz) + 7rim(th) (7) 
{:} (a - c - t h) 2 I (a - c - 2t h) 2 (a - c - t h) 2 (a - c - t h) 2 
4;3 - h + 9(3 > 4(3 - Iz + 4;3 
(a - c - 2th)2 (a - c - th)2 
{:} 9;3 > 4(3 - Iz 
(2) The low type has no incentive to deviate from its equilibrium strategy. 
When the cost competitiveness is of the low type, it is unprofitable for the 
domestic firm to deviate from its lobbying contribution Iz to the lobbying 
contribution Ih = 0, given that the foreign firm believes that the cost com-
petitiveness is of the high type and therefore enters the market. There-
fore, the domestic firm will abide by its lobbying contribution II if its true 
cost competitiveness is of the low type. Let Ll be the set containing lob-
bying contributions which satisfy the incentive-compatible condition for 
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When the separating equilibrium exists, the equilibrium strategies are lh = 
o and II E Lh n Ll, and the equilibrium beliefs are )"(ll) = 0 and )"(l) = 1, Vl tj. 
R \ lz. If the domestic firm chooses its lobbying contribution lz, then the foreign 
firm believes that the cost competitiveness is of the low type. Otherwise, the 
foreign firm believes that the cost competitiveness is of the high type. 
Proposition 1: There exists a unique un dominated separating equilibrium, 
where the strategies are lh = 0 and lz = (a-c-th)2 - (a-c- 2th)2 and the beliefs 4{3 9{3 
are )"(lz) = 0 and )"(l) = 1, Vl (j R \ ll. 
Proof: 
First, the set Lh n Ll is non-empty. Two incentive-compatible conditions 
can be rewritten as follows. 
II > 
(a - c - th)2 (a-c- 2th)2 
4jJ 9jJ 
lz < 
(a - c - tl)2 (a-c-2tz)2 
4jJ 9jJ 
L
h n L Z _ {(a-c-tz)2 _ (a-c-23tz)2 > l > (a-c-th)2 _ (a-c-2th)2}. Since 
- 4{3 9{3 - 1 - 4{3 9{3 
[(a-c-tz)2 _ (a-c-2tz)2] _ [(a-c-th? _ (a-c-2th)2] = (th -tl)(10a-l0c-th -tl) > 0, 4{3 9{3 4{3 9{3 
the set Lh n L Z is non-empty. 
Secondly, a unique undominated separating equilibrium exists. In the sep-
arating equilibrium, the reasonable lobbying contributions are the least cost 
. .. . _ (a-c-th)2 _ (a-c- 2th)2 QED 
lobbYIng contnbutlons. That IS, lh = 0 and lz - 4{3 9{3· . . 
From proposition 1, there is a unique reasonable separating equilibrium. 
The domestic firm of the high cost competitiveness type offers zero lobbying 
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contribution lh = 0 and the foreign firm enters the domestic market. The do-
mestic firm of the low cost competitiveness type offers a non-negative lobbying 
t ·b t· l (a-c- t h)2 (a-c- 2th)2 --L . .. con n u Ion I = 4f3 - 9f3 r 0 In order to sIgnal ItS true type to 
the foreign firm. As a result, the foreign firm believes that the cost competi-
tiveness is of the low type and stays outside the domestic market. That is to 
say, the domestic firm sacrifices its first-period profits to engage in lobbying 
activities and increases its second-period profits by remaining a monopoly. 
5.4 Pooling Equilibrium 
For the game of incomplete information described in the above section, the 
domestic firm would like to spend a positive amount of money II in order to 
convince the foreign firm that its cost competitiveness is of the low type. As 
a consequence, signalling through lobbying activities in the separating equi-
librium is costly. Under these circumstances, the pooling equilibrium may be 
used for the domestic firm to avoid separation if the profits of the domestic 
firm in the pooling equilibrium are higher than the profits of the domestic 
firm in the separating equilibrium. In this section, we need to know whether 
a pooling equilibrium exists and, if so, whether it dominates the separating 
equilibrium or not. 
The existence of pooling equilibrium 
Suppose that the domestic firm offers a uniform lobbying contribution l in 
the pooling equilibrium, irrespective of the type of cost competitiveness. That 
is, I = lh = ll. As a result, no information about the cost competitiveness 
is revealed and the foreign firm still remains uninformed. The belief of the 
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foreign firm is still pTob(ti = t h ) = )..(I) = A. In other words, the posterior and 
prior beliefs of cost competitiveness are the same. In addition, the existence 
of the pooling equilibrium requires that the expected payoff of the foreign firm 
is negative if the foreign firm enters the market, given the prior belief about 
cost competitiveness A. 3 That is, 
A7r~(th) + (1 - A)7r~(tl) < 0 (9) 
{::} A[ (a - c + th)2] + (1 _ A) [( a - c + tz)2] _ F < 0 
9~ 9~ 
If the equation (9) is satisfied, there exists a pooling equilibrium. The 
domestic firm would like to offer a uniform lobbying contribution in the first 
period, and the entry of the foreign firm is deterred. An obvious candidate 
for pooling equilibrium, which does not depend upon the type of cost com-
petitiveness t, is a zero lobbying contribution. That is to say, the domestic 
firm of both types chooses I = 0, which is the same as the full information 
case. Out of equilibrium beliefs are cost competitiveness of high type. If a 
lobbying contribution l deviates I = 0, the foreign firm will enter the mar-
keto The monopoly profits of the domestic firm are higher than the duopoly 
profits of the domestic firm minus the lobbying contribution. Therefore, the 
domestic firm of the high type will not spend any money on lobbying activi-
ties. Otherwise, foreign entry is induced and profit decreases. That is to say, 
3See Milgram and Robert (1982) and Tirole (1989). 
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7rim (th , I) + 7rim(th) > 7rim(th, l) + 7riAth) (10) 
(a - c - t h) 2 (a - c - 2th) 2 
{:} 4,8 > 9,8 - l 
If equation (9) does not hold, the expected profit of the foreign firm in the 
second period is strictly positive after entering the market. The entry of the 
foreign firm is not deterred in this case. As a result, the domestic firm of the low 
cost type has an incentive to signal its true cost competitiveness to the foreign 
firm in order to deter entry. For any fixed pooling equilibrium I, there exists 
an out-of-equilibrium lobbying contribution l such that deviation increases the 
profits of the domestic firm of low type. The monopoly profits of the domestic 
firm minus the separating lobbying contribution are higher than the duopoly 
profits of the domestic firm minus the pooling lobbying contribution. That is 
7rim(tl, l) + 7rim(tl) > 7rim(th, I) + 7riAtl) (11) 
(a - c - tl? (a - c - 2tl)2 {:} . - l > ~----'--
4,8 - 9,8 
Any lobbying contribution l satisfying l < (a-~~tz)2 - (a-~~2tz)2 destabilizes 
the pooling equilibrium. No pooling equilibrium would be used by the domestic 
firm. Note that the lobbying contribution of the low type II 
(a-c-2th? < (a-c-tz)2 _ (a-c-2tz? 
9(3 - 4(3 9(3 
Proposition 2: If equation (9) holds, the pooling lobbying contribution I = 0 
for both types is the refined equilibrium. If equation (9) does not hold, the 
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separating lobbying contributions lh = 0 for the high type and lz = (a-~~th)2 -
(a-c- 2th)2 
9{3 > 0 for the low type are the refined equilibrium. 
If the expected profits of entering the market are negative, the foreign 
firm would not enter the market. The domestic firm of both types offers a 
zero lobbying contribution so that its profits are the highest. In this case, 
the pooling equilibrium is the refined equilibrium. If the expected profits 
of entering the market are positive, the foreign firm will enter the market. 
Therefore, the domestic firm of the low cost competitiveness has an incentive 
to signal its true type to the uninformed foreign firm in order to deter entry. 
Under these circumstances, the domestic firm will offer lobbying contribution 
lh = 0 if its cost competitiveness is of the high type; and will offer lobbying 
contribution lz > 0 if its cost competitiveness is of the low type. The separating 
equilibrium is the refined equilibrium. 
The welfare comparison between two equilibria 
Since the domestic firm exports outputs to the third country, the social wel-
fare of the domestic country is equal to the profits of the domestic firm in this 
model. 4 Therefore, the social welfare of the domestic country under pooling 
equilibrium Wp is the expected profit of the domestic firm if entry is not al-
lowed. That is, the domestic welfare is equal to the weighted sum of monopoly 
profits of the domestic firm of both types. Similarly, the social welfare under 
separating equilibrium Ws is the expected profits of the domestic firm when 
4If firms are assumed to compete in the domestic market, the social welfare contains not 
only the profits of the domestic firm but also the consumer surplus. The above analysis is 
the same and the following reasoning also holds for this case. 
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entry is allowed. That is, the weighted sum of the duopoly profits of the do-
mestic firm of the high type and the monopoly profits of the domestic firm 
of the low type minus the lobbying contribution. If the social welfare under 
the separating equilibrium is higher than the social welfare under the pooling 
equilibrium, there is a positive role for lobbying in the incomplete informa-
tion case. Otherwise, even if the private information can be revealed through 
lobbying activities, social welfare is still decreased. Under these circumstance, 
lobbying behaviour should be banned. 
Proposition 3: Social welfare under the pooling equilibrium is always higher 
than social welfare under the signalling equilibrium. 
Proof: 
Since Y = 0 and lh = 0, lz = (O:-C- t h)2 - (O:-C- 2th)2 social welfare for both 4~ 9~' 
equilibria is as follows: 
w; -P -
The social welfare difference can be calculated as follows: 
The social welfare Ws is always smaller than the social welfare Wp. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3 suggests that the benefits of lobbying activities are lower 
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than the costs of lobbying activities, so that social welfare under the pool-
ing equilibrium is higher than social welfare under the separating equilibrium. 
5 Although lobbying activities can provide information when information is 
incomplete, signalling through lobbying contribution is costly. Lobbying activ-
ity should be banned in the case of incomplete information with the potential 
foreign entry. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the issue of the positive role of lobbying activity 
when potential foreign entry is considered. Since lobbying is a kind of rent-
seeking behaviour, lobbying expenditure decreases social welfare. However, 
there might be a positive role for lobbying if incomplete information is con-
sidered. But when we incorporate potential foreign entry into a two-period 
lobbying-influence model, the social welfare of the domestic country still de-
creases as in the complete information case. As a result, no positive role for 
lobbying is suggested. When the information of cost competitiveness is in-
complete, the domestic firm has two choices in this model: either a separating 
lobbying contribution or a pooling lobbying contribution. If the expected prof-
its of the foreign firm to enter the market are negative, the domestic firm of 
both types will offer a zero lobbying contribution in the pooling equilibrium. 
Otherwise, the domestic firm offers its lobbying contribution according to its 
cost competitiveness in the separating equilibrium. When cost competitiveness 
is of the low type, the domestic firm will offer a positive lobbying contribution 
5When firms compete in the domestic market, the social welfare difference between 
the separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium is uncertain. That is, lFs - Wp = 
~[(a-c-2th)2 _ (a-c-t h )"] + ~[(a-c+th)2 + 2(a-c+th )(a-c-2th )]. 
2 9j3 4j3 2 9j3 9j3 
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and the foreign firm will stay outside the market. When cost competitiveness 
is of the high type, the domestic firm will offer a zero lobbying contribution 
and the foreign firm will enter the market. 
When the lobbying contribution is used as a information revelation mech-
anism, there is no distortion in the product market. Since no foreign firm is in 
the market in the first period, the role of lobbying contribution is purely like 
burning money to reveal its private information in this model. Although the 
foreign firm can make its entry decision according to the lobbying contribution 
offered by the domestic firm, signalling is costly. The benefits obtained by 
the lobbying activity are lower than the costs devoted to lobbying activity in 
this case. Social welfare under the pooling equilibrium is always higher than 
it is under the separating equilibrium. There is no positive role for lobbying 
with regard to social welfare. Although the benefits of lobbying always exist 
in the conditions of incomplete information, lobbying activities should not be 
encouraged. However, if firms compete in the domestic market instead of in 
the third market, social welfare includes not only the profits of the domestic 
firm but also the consumer surplus. In this case, although the profits of the 
domestic firm are higher under the pooling equilibrium than they are under 
the separating equilibrium, the consumer surplus is" lower under the pooling 
equilibrium than it is under the separating equilibrium. As a result, social 
welfare under the separating equilibrium might be bigger than that under the 
pooling equilibrium. Lobbying activities may still have a positive role. That 
is to say, the result obtained in this chapter is not robust. However, the argu-
ment that lobbying increases social welfare under incomplete information does 
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not always hold as suggested in the literature. Since the result depends on the 
precise contents of social welfare in different models, future research can be 
conducted to see how different settings will affect the welfare effect of lobbying 
activities when information is incomplete. 
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Chapter 6 Tariffs, Political Efficiency 
and the Median Voter 
6.1 Introduction 
It is generally recognized that income taxes are a more efficient tax instru-
ment than trade taxes. However, tariffs are quite often used as an important 
source of tax revenue. Different taxation policy has been adopted by coun-
tries at different stages of economic development in tax history (Riezman and 
Wilson, 1995). Taking the United States as an example, tariffs provided on 
average more than 50 per cent of government revenue from 1879 to 1914. Prior 
to the Civil War, this ratio actually stood at 90 per cent. After income taxes 
were introduced in 1913, the average U.S. tariff rate dropped sharply and in-
come taxes became the major source of United States government tax revenue 
(Baack and Ray, 1983). Moreover, Conybeare (1983) identified a negative re-
lationship between average tariff levels and gross domestic product per capita 
for 35 countries. The average tariff level for developing countries was about 50 
percent, and for developed countries was around 11 percent at that time. Ro-
drik (1995) also suggests that an increase in per capita income of 1,000 dollars 
is associated with a reduction of 3.7 percent in the share of trade taxes. In 
general, a robust negative relationship exists between per capita income and 
the share of trade taxes in total tax revenue. That is to say, tariffs are adopted 
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as a major source of tax revenue in a country's early stage of economic devel-
opment whereas the importance of tariff revenue declines with income growth. 
When its economy is more developed, income taxes become the main source 
of tax revenue although tariffs still sometimes remain. These facts raise an in-
teresting and important question: How to explain the taxation choice between 
income taxes and trade taxes for different levels of economic development? 
Some explanations for the above issues are provided in the literature. Grant 
and Kimbrough (1991) develop an optimal tax raising programme model, in 
which relative collection costs play an important role in explaining the choice 
between tariffs and other forms of tax regimes. Since tariffs are easy to handle 
in terms of administrative considerations, trade taxes rather than income taxes 
are chosen in the beginning. When the benefits of avoiding more distorting 
trade taxes are larger than the collection costs of income taxes, it is very likely 
that the government will switch to income taxes. Recently, however, a new 
political economic literature has emerged, which emphasize the non-benevolent 
nature of a government. This explanation therefore seems incomplete. In 
addition, the tariff policy can be adopted in the early economic development for 
other reasons than collecting taxes, for example the infant industry protection 
argument. Brainard and Verider (1993) use a dynamic version of Grossman 
and Helpman (1993) to explain why tariffs are still used when the economy 
is developed. Once a protective tariff is established, it is difficult to remove 
because existing interests will fight against any movement away from tariffs 
as a primary revenue-raising device. Therefore, the government cannot easily 
switch to an alternative. In other words, tariff protection today is very likely 
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to be maintained tomorrow because of policy persistence. Nevertheless, this 
explanation remains incomplete. If we recognize that politically influential 
actors are involved, we must explain why tariffs are politically acceptable as a 
main source of tax revenue in the first place. Moreover, this reasoning should 
also explain why income taxes are adopted later on in economic development. 
That is to say, we must ask: Why are voters or interest groups content with 
trade taxes rather than income taxes when national income is low? And then, 
when the economy is developed, why might these politically influential actors 
switch their support to another tax instrument such as income taxes? 
A political economy answer on the issue of the choice among taxation 
instruments for a democratic society is proposed. Suppose that politicians 
are self-interested and desire to stay in office; then this will lead them to enact 
those policies which satisfy the majority of voters. The median voter, who 
lies at the median of a distribution of voters' preferences on certain issues, 
represents the position of the majority of voters 1. The government is assumed 
to propose two discrete taxation policy alternatives: trade taxes and income 
taxes. Each policy needs to raise enough tax revenue in order to balance a fixed 
budget target. Voters are assumed to support their own preferred tax policy. 
Therefore, the tax instrument which yields the highest utility for the median 
voter is preferred. In general, voters are happier if they pay less net taxes to 
the government. The results suggest that the choice of taxation instruments 
depends on the income level and income tax payments, which are determined 
1 Enelow and Hinich (1984) prove that the median voter theorem holds if (1) the issue 
has a single dimension and (2) the preferences of each voter are single-peaked in that one 
dimension. For more details, see Mueller (1989). 
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by the tax method and income distribution. If the income tax of the median 
voter is higher than that of the pivotal voter, the trade tax policy is preferred. 
Otherwise, the income tax policy is supported. It is possible that a country 
chooses trade taxes in the early stage of economic development, and then 
switches to income taxes in the latter stage of economic development. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 6.2 we 
set out the basic majority voting framework when two discrete taxation policy 
alternatives are proposed. When preferences of all individuals are assumed to 
take the Gorman functional form, how individuals choose between trade taxes 
and income taxes is analyzed. Section 6.3 uses the Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion as an example to discuss the impact of the structure of income taxes. The 
relationship between the choice of taxation method and the level of economic 
development is also discussed. Section 6.4 presents concluding remarks. 
6.2 The Basic Model 
Suppose that there are n individuals in the domestic country. Each in-
dividual is assumed to have income Ii and therefore the total income of the 
domestic country can be calculated as the sum of each individual's income, i.e. 
I = l:~=1 Ii. The income probability distribution and the income cumulative 
distribution functions are f(I) and F(I) on the interval [0, i). F(I) is the 
fraction of individuals with an income of less than I so that F(O) = 0 and 
F(i) = 1. Moreover, suppose that both a domestic product x and a foreign 
product y are consumed in the domestic market. The prices of the domestic 
and foreign products are Px and Py • Each individual is assumed to purchase 
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the amount of domestic product Xi and foreign product Yi. The total consump-
tion of the domestic product is X = L:7=1 Xi and the total consumption of the 
foreign product is Y = L:7=1 Yi. Therefore, the individual's indirect utility 
function can be denoted as Vi(Px , Py , Ii). Moreover, the most general indirect 
utility function of the Gorman form, which allows for aggregation in the sense 
of the representative individual model, is used for all individuals. 2 
(1) 
In order to focus on the relationship between an individual's income and 
taxation choices, all individuals are assumed to have identical preferences. 
That is to say, the parameter ai is the same for all individuals, i,e, ai = 
aj = a Vi,j. Moreover, assume that the marginal income utility b(Px , Py) is 
positive. The higher the level of an individual's income, the higher the level 
of the individual's utility. By Roy's identity, the demand functions for the 
domestic good X and foreign good Y of consumer i will then take the form: 
_ 8a(Px , Py)/8Px _ 8b(Px , Py)/8Px Ii 
b(Px , Py) b(Px , Py) 
(2) 
_ 8a(Px , Py)/8Py _ 8b(Px , Py)/8Py Ii 
b(Px , Py) b(Px , Py) 
The individual demand for both the domestic and foreign products depends 
on the individual's income level. When the level of an individual's income 
2See Varian (1991), Microeconornic analysis, P153-154. 
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increases, the individual's demand for the domestic and foreign products is 
higher. The aggregate demand for the domestic product X and the aggregate 
demand for the foreign product Y, which can be derived simply by adding the 
individual demand for each good, are as follows. 
(3) 
Similarly, the aggregate demand for both the domestic and foreign products 
depends on the aggregate income level. When the level of aggregate income 
increases, the aggregate demand for the domestic and foreign products is also 
higher. 
In addition, the domestic government needs to raise a certain amount of 
tax revenue in order to finance its budget G. Suppose that only income taxes 
and trade taxes are available. When trade taxes are proposed, the domestic 
government imposes a specific tariff rate t on imports. The price of the foreign 
product becomes Py+t. Since the budget is balanced by trade taxes, we can get 
G = tY(P
x
, Py + t, 1). As a consequence, the tariff rate is a function of income 
and the price of the domestic and foreign products, i.e. t = 1(1, Px , Py). As 
long as income and the price of the domestic and foreign products are fixed, 
the tariff rate is fixed. Aggregate utility and demand for both the domestic 
and foreign products can be calculated as follows. 
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na(Px , Py + t) + b(Px , Py + t)I (4) 
8a(Px , Py + t)/8Px 8b(Px , Py + t)/8Px --~--~--~~- I 
b(Px , Py + t) b(Px , Py + t) 
_ 8a(Px , Py + t)/8(Py + t) _ 8b(Px , Py + t)/8(Py + t) I 
b(Px , Py + t) b(Px , Py + t) 
When income taxes are proposed, the level of income taxes T is equal to 
the government budget G. The price of the foreign product is still Py and the 
disposable income is equal to the national income less income taxes, i.e. 1-T. 
As a consequence, income taxes and trade taxes should be revenue equivalent 
so that G = T = tY(Px , Py + t, 1). Income taxes are a function of income, i.e. 
G = T(1) = 'ETi(Ii). As long as an income distribution is fixed, income taxes 
are fixed and individual's income taxes depend on the income tax schedule. 
The aggregate utility and demand for both the domestic and foreign products 
can be calculated as follows. 
V(Px , Py, 1- T) 
X(Px , Py , 1- T) 
na(Px , Py) + b(Px , Py)(I - T) (5) 
_ oa(Px , Py)/8Px _ 8b(Px , Py)/8Px (I - T) 
b(Px , Py) b(Px , Py) 
_ 8a(Px , Py)/8Py _ 8b(Px , Py)/8Py (I _ T) 
b(Px , Py) b(Px , Py) 
It has been shown that income taxes are a more efficient taxation method 
than trade taxes (Varian, 1992; Dixit, 1985; Rodrik, 1995). A country is 
always worse off facing a tariff rate than an income tax that generates the 
same tax revenue. That is to say, if G = tY = T, then V(Px , Py, I - T) > 
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v ( Px , Py + t, 1) . In general, a country should collect a certain amount of 
taxes in order to balance its budget and therefore taxes are revenue equivalent. 
However, the efficiency of income taxes at the aggregate level need not carry 
over into the preferences of individual voters. This is because individual voters 
care about their own tax burden. If trade taxes and income taxes are not 
revenue equivalent, utility under trade taxes might be higher than utility under 
income taxes. As a result, if individuals can express their preference through 
majority voting, it is possible that majority voters will support trade taxes 
instead of more efficient income taxes. 
Majority Voting 
In a democratic society, assume that a government proposes alternative tax-
ation policy instruments and that individuals express their preferences through 
majority voting. Suppose that each individual has different preferences and 
will vote for the policy which yields the highest utility. If a taxation instrument 
is preferred by most people, the government will adopt this policy. Therefore, 
the alternative giving the highest utility to the majority of voters is supported. 
Majority voting is well defined since there are only two alternatives: trade taxes 
and income taxes. When trade taxes are proposed, there are no income taxes, 
but a specific tariff rate t is imposed. The individual's indirect utility and 
demand for both domestic and foreign products are as follows: 
a(Px , Py + t) + b(Px , Py + t)Ii (6) 
_ 8a(Px , Py + t)/8Px _ 8b(Px , Py + t)/8Px Ii 
b(Px , Py + t) b(Px , Py + t) 
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_ 8a(Px , Py + t)/8(Py + t) _ 8b(Px , Py + t)/8(Py + t) J. 
b(Px , Py + t) b(Px , Py + t) t 
Similarly, when income taxes are proposed, there are no trade t axes ~ but 
individual income taxes Ti are imposed. The individual's indirect utility and 
demand for both the domestic and foreign product are as follows: 
a(Px , Py) + b(Px , Py)(Ii - Ti) (7) 
_ 8a(Px , Py)/8Px _ 8b(Px , Py)/8Px (J. _ T·) 
b(Px , Py) b(Px , Py) t t 
8a(Px , Py)/8Py _ 8b(Px , Py)/8Py (J. _ T) 
b(Px , Py) b(Px , Py) t t 
In addition, suppose that the individual's income tax rate is 'Yi = Td Ii. 
When progressive income taxes are used, if Ii < Ij , then 'Yi < 'Yj. When 
regressive income taxes are used, if Ii < I j , then 'Yi > 'Yj. When uniform 
income taxes are used, the income tax rate is fixed, i.e. 'Y = 'Yi = 'Yj. 
Proof: 
I · - T- > I· - T· t t - J J 
{::} (1 - 'Yi)Ii > (1 - 'Yj )Ij 
I· {::} (1 - 'Yi) > (1 - 'Yj) h Q.E.D. 
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Lemma 1 ensures that the pre-tax and after-tax ordering of individuals by 
income remains the same. In other words, if L > IJ' then L - T > I, - T,. 
0- 0 z_ J J 
However, this may not hold for all tax methods. When the regressive income 
tax is adopted, this condition always holds since 1 - 'Yi > 1 - 'Yj > (1 - Ij) t. 
When the progressive income tax is adopted, if Ii > I j , then Ii - Ti > I j - Tj 
requires 1 - 'Yi > (1 - 'Yj) t holds. 
Lemma 2: Suppose that a pivotal voter j, whose income is I;, is indifferent to 
the choice between trade taxes and income taxes such that Vj(I;, Px , Py + t) = 
v j (I; - Tj* , Px , Py). For an individual i with income I:, which tax policy gives a 
higher utility depends on both the income difference I: - I; and the disposable 
income difference [(I; - Tj*) - (I: - TD]. 
Proof: 
When the individual's income is I:, the difference between utility Vi (I: -
Ti, Px , Py) and vi(I:, Px , Py + t) is as follows: 
[a(Px , Py + t) + b(Px , Py + t)I;] - [a(Px , Py) + b(Px , Py)(I~ - Tn] 
[a(Px , Py + t) - a(Px , Py)] + [b(Px , Py + t)I~ - b(Px , Py)(I~ - Tn] 
[b(P
x
, Py)(Ij - Tj*) - b(Px , Py + t)Ij] + [b(Px , Py + t)I~ - b(Px , Py)(I~ - Tn] 
b(Px , Py)[(I; - Tj*) - (I~ - Tn] + b(Px , Py + t)(I~ - Ij) 
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Marginal income utilities b(Px , Py) and b(Px , Py + t) are positive. The sign 
of Vi ( Ii, Px , Py + t) - Vi (Ii - Ti, Px , Py) depends on the income levels of rand 
z 
Ij and the income tax payment Ti and Tj*. 
(1) If (I; - Tj*) > (I: - Tn, the first term b(Px , Py)[(I; - Tj*) - (I: - Tn] is 
positive. If I: > I;, then the second term b( Px , Py + t) (Ii - I;) is positive. 
Therefore, vi(I:, Px , Py + t) > vi(Ii - Ti, Px , Py). 
(2) If (I; - Tj*) < (I: - TD, the first term b(Px , Py)[(I; - Tj*) - (I: - TD] 
is negative. If Ii < I;, then the second term b( Px , Py + t) (II - IJ) is 
negative. Therefore, Vi (I:, Px , Py + t) < Vi (I: - Tf, Px , Py). 
(3) If (I; - Tj*) < (I: - Tn, the first term b(Px , Py)[(I; - Tj*) - (I: - Tn] 
is negative. If I: > I;; then the second term b(Px , Py + t)(II - IJ) is 
positive. Therefore, the sign of Vi (II, Px , Py + t) - Vi (I: - T:, Px , Py) is 
uncertain. 
is positive. If II < I;, then the second term b( Px , Py + t) (II - Ij) is 
negative. Therefore, the sign of Vi (II, Px , Py + t) > Vi (II - T:, Px , Py) is 
uncertain. Q.E.D. 
From Lemma 2, we know that the income tax and trade tax alternatives 
yield the same utility for the pivotal voter, i.e. Vj (I; , Px , Py + t) = Vj(I; -
T'!' P P) For an individual with income r, which tax alternative is preferred J' x, y. z 
depends on both the individual income level II and the disposable income 
Ii - Tf. Since the utility of each individual depends on his/her income, if 
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an individual has a higher income level, the individual's utility is also higher. 
As a result, when trade taxes are proposed, if the individual's income l' is t 
larger than the income of the pivotal voter I;, then trade taxes yield a higher 
utility to the individual i. Similarly, when income taxes are proposed, if the 
individual's disposable income II - Tf is larger than the income of the pivotal 
voter I; - Tj* , then income taxes yield a higher utility to individual i. That is 
to say, if II > I; and II - Tf < I; - TI, trade taxes yield a higher utility and 
income taxes yield a lower utility to individual i so the trade tax alternative 
is preferred. If II < I; and II - Tf > I; - Tj*' trade taxes yield a lower 
utility and income taxes yield a higher utility to the individual i so the income 
tax alternative is preferred. For the other cases, which policy is preferred by 
individual i is uncertain. 
Nevertheless, Lemma 1 ensures that the ordering of an individual's income 
and disposal income is the same for both regressive and progressive income 
tax methods. That is to say, if II > I;, then the first term of the utility 
difference b(Px , Py)[(I; - Tj*) - (II - TD] is negative and the second term of 
the utility difference b(Px , Py + t)(II - I;) is positive. Therefore, the sign of 
the utility difference between trade taxes and income taxes is hard to decide. 
In addition, a voter with an income Ii such that JJi f(I)dI = 1/2 is called a 
median income voter. The median income voter is the median voter in this 
model because the ordering of individual income is the same as the ordering 
of individual utility. That is to say, the median income voter with Ii divides 
voters into half according to their indirect utility. As a result, the position of 
the median income voter is decisive to the outcome of majority voting for a 
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country. The policy choice for alternative tax instruments can be obtained as 
follows. 
Proposition 1: Suppose that the income of a pivotal voter is I": and the J 
income of the median voter is Ii. If b(Px, Py) [(I; - Tj) - (Ii - T i)] + b(Px, Py + 
t)(Ii - I;) > 0, a trade tax policy is preferred. Similarly, if b(Px,Py)[(I;-
T j*) - (Ii - T i)] + b(Px, Py + t)(Ii - IJ) < 0, an income tax policy is preferred. 
Proof: 
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we know that the utility difference for the 
median voter is as follows. 
(Ii - T i)] < o. Therefore, the signs of the first and the second terms of the 
utility difference are never the same. 
(-I P D + t) (-I T P P) < 0 An income tax policy is pre-Vi i, x, ry - Vi i - i, x, y - . 
ferred. Q.E.D. 
From proposition 1, which policy is preferred by the majority of voters 
depends on the level of marginal income utility, the income tax schedule and the 
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relative positions of the pivotal and median voters in the income distribution. 
However, it is difficult to see clearly how the sign of the utility difference 
changes. If the levels of marginal income utility b(Px , Py) and b(Px , Py + t) 
are assumed to be the same, a more clear-cut result of majority voting can be 
obtained as follows. 
Corollary 1: Suppose that b(Px , Py) = b(Px , Py+t). IfTi > Tj*' then the trade 
tax policy is preferred. If Ti > Tj*' then the income tax policy is preferred. 
Moreover, when a uniform income tax is used, which taxation policy yields a 
higher utility depends on the income level. 
Proof: 
Vi (Ii , Px , Py + t) - Vi(Ji - T i, Px , Py) 
b(Px , Py)[(Ij - T/) - (Ji - T i)] + b(Px , Py + t)(Ji - Ij) 
b(Px , Py)(Ti - Tj*) 
(1) If Ti - Tj* > 0, then Vi (Ji, Px , Py + t) - Vi(Ji - T i, Px , Py) > o. Trade tax 
policy is preferred 
(2) If Ti - Tj* < 0, then Vi (Ji , Px , Py + t) - Vi(Ji - T i, Px , Py) < O. Income tax 
policy is preferred. 
Suppose that the uniform income tax rate r is used. The utility difference 
between the two taxation instruments is as follows. 
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'[)i (Ii , Px , Py + t) - Vi (Ii - T i, Px , Py) 
b(Px , Py )1(li - Ij) 
(1) If Ii - Ij > 0, then Vi (Ii , Px , Py + t) - vi(Ii - T i, Px , Py) > 0. Trade tax 
policy yields a higher utility. 
(2) If Ii - Ij < 0, then Vi (Ii, Px , Py + t) - Vi (Ii - T i , Px , Py) < 0. Income tax 
policy yields a higher utility. Q.E.D. 
It is quite clear that each individual prefers to pay less taxes to the govern-
ment. If Ti - TI > 0, trade tax policy yields a higher utility and is preferred. 
Similarly, if Ti - T/ < 0, income tax policy yields a higher utility and is pre-
ferred. As a result, if the relative income tax positions of the median and 
pivotal voters are known, the taxation choice through majority voting can be 
obtained. Moreover, if the uniform income tax rate is adopted, the ordering 
of individual income is equal to the ordering of individual income taxes. A 
clear-cut relationship between the income level and the taxation preferences 
can be derived. In fact, no matter which tax method is adopted, it is often 
true that the higher the level of income, the higher the level of income taxes. 
That is, if I: > Ij then T: > Tr As a result, when a uniform income tax 
is adopted, if we know the relative income positions of the median voter and 
the pivotal voter, the utility difference between income taxes and trade taxes 
can be derived. Under these circumstances, what is the link between national 
income and the relative positions of the pivotal and median voters for different 
stages of economic development? 
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First of all, how does the position of the median voter in the income distri-
bution change over time? Suppose that the national income increases from II 
to 12. Since the government budget needs to be balanced, the uniform income 
tax rate also changes from /,1 to /,2 such that G = /,1 II = /,212. The income 
tax rate decreases with economic growth, i.e. /,1 > /,2. As the economy of 
a country develops, although almost every individual income increases, the 
position of the median income voter depends on the shape of skewness in the 
income distribution. 3 When the economy is developed, the position of the 
median voter shifts as follows. 
Lemma 3: When the economy of a country is developed, the skewness of the 
income distribution is assumed to change from J-L§ to J-L~. If J-L~ < J-L§, the income 
distribution becomes more skewed to the left. Therefore, the position of the 
median voter shifts to the right. If J-L~ > J-L§, the income distribution become 
more skewed to the right. Therefore, the shifted position of the median voter 
is uncertain. 
Proof: 
Suppose that the average national income is I. The skewness of the income 
distribution f(I) is J-L3 = E[(X - I)3]. If J-L~ = J-L§, the shape of the income 
income distribution remains the same. When the economy is developed, the 
income of the median income voter is therefore increased. The income position 
of the median voter shifts right. Similarly, if J-L~ < J-L§, the income distribution 
is more skewed to the left and therefore the position of the median voter shifts 
3The skewness of a distribution f(X) is measured by /1-3 = E[(X - u)3], where u is the 
mean. If the tail is on the left hand side, the distribution is skewed to the left, i.e. /1-3 < O. 
If tail is on the right hand side, the distribution is skewed to the right, i.e. /1-3 > O. 
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to the right. However, if f-L~ > f-L!, the income distribution is more skewed to 
the right. The income position of the median voter is unknown. Q.E.D. 
Secondly, what is the position of the pivotal voter over time when the 
income distribution changes? Since the government budget is balanced, we 
know that G = t Y ( Px , Py + t, 1). The tariff rate is a function of the price of both 
the domestic and foreign products and the income level, i.e. t = f(Px , Py , 1). 
When the national income increases, the tariff rate decreases from t 1 to t 2 , i.e. 
t2 < tl. The position of the pivotal voter changes with economic development 
as follows. 
Lemma 4: \Vben the economy of a country is developed, the position of the 
pivotal voter shifts left. 
Proof: 
Suppose that the pivotal voter with income 1* is indifferent to both income 
taxes and trade taxes in the early stage of economic development. That is, 
v;(1*) Px ) Py + t 1) = v;(I* - Tj*) Px ) Py) 
{::} a(P
x
, Py + t 1) + b(Px , Py + t1)1* = a(Px , Py) + b(Px , Py)(I* - T*) 
As the economy is developed, if an individual has income 1*, the taxation 
utility changes as follows. 
(1) The utility difference of trade taxes. 
v;(1*) Px ) Py + t 2 ) - v; (1* ,PX ) Py + t 1 ) 
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a(Px , Py + t2) + b(P.7J' Py + t2)I* - a(Px , Py + t1) + b(Px , Py + t1)I* 
a(Px , Py + t2) - a(Px , Py + t1) + b(Px , Py + t2)(I* - 1*) 
a(Px , Py + t2) - a(Px , Py + t1) > 0 
Since t2 < tl, we can get a(Px , Py + t2) > a(Px , Py + ti). The utility 
difference of trade taxes is therefore positive. 
(2)The utility difference of income taxes. 
a(Px , Py) + b(Px , Py)(I* - T*) - a(Px , Py) + b(Px , Py)(I* - T*) 
b(Px , Py)(l- '"'(1)1* - (1 - '"'(2)1* 
b(Px , Py)I*('"'(2 - '"'(1) < 0 
Note that '"'(1 > '"'(2. The utility difference of trade taxes is negative. 
As a result, the utility of trade taxes is higher than the utility of income 
taxes. An individual with income 1* in the later stage of economic development 
prefers trade taxes. The new pivotal voter must have a lower income level 
than 1* so that both taxation policies yield the same utility. Therefore, when 
the economy of a country is more developed, the position of the pivotal voter 
shifts left. Q.E.D. 
When the national income increases, the new position of the pivotal and 
median voters can be derived as in Lemmas 3 and 4. If the skewness of the 
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income distribution is known, which tax policy is preferred through majority 
voting can be obtained as follows. 
Proposition 2: '-Vhen national income increases, if the income distribution is 
skewed to the left, a country will adopt trade taxes. If the income distribution 
is skewed to the right, either trade taxes or income taxes can be adopted. 
From proposition 2, if the income distribution is more skewed to the left 
through time, the position of the median voter shifts to the right. Since the 
position of the pivotal voter always shifts to the left with economic growth, 
trade taxes are preferred through majority voting in the later stage of economic 
development. If the income distribution is more skewed to the right through 
time, the shifted position of the median voter is uncertain. Either trade taxes 
or income taxes would be preferred by the majority of voters when national 
income grows. 
6.3 Example: The Cobb-Douglas Utility Function 
Suppose that the utility functions of all individuals are Cobb-Douglas, 
which is a special case of the Gorman form. Each individual is assumed to 
maximize his/her utility function subject to his/her income. That is, 
Max alnXi + (1 - a)lnYi (8) 
By using the Lagrange method, the individual's demand for both the do-
mestic good X and the foreign good Y of consumer i and the individual's 
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indirect utility can be derived as follows: 
aI 
'/, 
Px 
(1 - a)Ii 
Py 
lnIi - alnPx - (1 - a)lnPy 
(9) 
If the domestic government imposes a specific tariff on the foreign product, 
the demand for the domestic and foreign products and indirect utility can be 
calculated as follows: 
aL 
'/, 
Px 
(10) 
(1 - a)Ii 
Py +t 
lnIi - alnPx - (1 - a)ln(Py + t) 
When an income tax policy is proposed by the government and the income 
tax payment of each individual is Ti , the demand for both domestic and foreign 
products and indirect utility can be obtained as follows: 
a(Ii - Ti) 
Px 
(1 - a) (Ii - Ti) 
Py 
In(Ii - Ti) - alnPx - (1 - a)lnPy 
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(11) 
Since each individual voter chooses between trade taxes and income taxes , 
the tax policy alternative which yields a higher utility is preferred. 
Lemma 5: Suppose that the pivotal voter j, whose income is I; , is indifferent 
to the choice between trade taxes and income taxes such that Vj (I; , Px , Py + 
t) = vj(Ij - Tj*' Px , Py). For an individual with an income I:, the choice 
between tax alternatives depends only on the income tax rate. If,,~ > ,,;, 
then Vi (I:, Px , Py + t) > Vi (I: - T:, Px , Py). A trade tax policy is preferred. If 
,,: < "j, then vi(I:, Px , Py + t) < vi(I: - Ti, PXl Py). An income tax policy is 
preferred. 
Proof: 
The utilities for trade taxes and income taxes are the same for a pivotal 
voter j with income Ij. That is, 
{:} lnI; - alnPx - (1 - a)ln(Py + t) = In(I; - Tj*) - alnPx - (1 - o.)lnPy 
{:} lnI; - (1 - a)ln(Py + t) = In(I; - Tj*) - (1 - o.)lnPy 
{:} lnI; - In(I; - Tj*) = (1 - a)(ln(Py + t) - lnPy) 
I~ - T~ Py {:} In J J = (1 - o.)l71,-"':::""-
I*: Py + t J 
For an individual with an income I:, the utility difference between trade 
taxes and income taxes can be calculated as follows: 
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[In(I: - Tf) - alnPx - (1 -- a)lnPy] - [(lnI: - alnPx - (1 - a)ln(Py + t)] 
[In(I: - Tn - lnIn - [(1 - a)lnPy - (1 - a)ln(Py + t)] 
r - T! Po In t t - (1 - a)ln y 
II Py + t 
r - T! I"': - T~ In t t _ l J J 
I , n * i I j 
In(l - 1~) - In(l - 1j) 
l 1 - 1: T/,--;"':'" 
1 - 11 
The relationship between the utility difference and the income tax rate can 
be obtained as follows. 
Vi(I: - TI, Px , Py) - Vi (I; , Px , Py + t) > 0 
1 - , {:} In 1i > 0 
1 - 11 -
1 - ' {:} 1i > 1 
1 - 11 -
{:} 1 - , . .,/ > 1 - 'Y~ 
It - IJ 
'< * {:} 'Y. 'Y. It - IJ 
If 1: > 1; then Vi (II, Px , Py + t) > Vi (I; - Ti, Px , Py), then trade taxes are 
preferred. Similarly, if 1: < 1; then vi(II, Px , Py + t) < Vi (II - Ti, Px , Py), then 
income taxes are preferred. Q.E.D. 
Since b(Px , Py) is a constant in the indirect utility of the Cobb-Douglas 
function, the choice of tax alternative depends on the income tax rate. For 
any individual with income I:, if the individual's income tax rate 1~ is higher 
than the income tax rate of the pivotal voter 1;, trade taxes are preferred. If 
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the individual's income tax rate 1'~ is lower than the income tax rate of the 
pivotal voter 1';, income taxes are preferred. In addition, when progressive 
income taxes are adopted, if r > I~, then ro./ > "'\I~ Otherwise "'\I' < "'\I~ When 
t - J It - IJ' , It - IJ' 
regressive income taxes are adopted, if I~ > I;, then 1'~ < 1';. Otherwise: 
,../ > "'\I~ 
It - IJ' 
Proposition 3: Suppose th8,t the income of the pivotal voter is I~ and the J 
income of the median voter is Ii' When progressive income taxes are adopted, 
if Ii > I;, then the trade taxation policy is preferred. If Ii < I;, then the 
income taxation policy is preferred. VVb.en regressive income taxes are adopted, 
if Ii > I;, then the income taxation policy is preferred. If Ii < I;, then the 
trade taxation policy is preferred. 
Proof: 
From Lemma 5, we can get the following result. 
Thus the choice of tax alternative depends on the income tax rate. When , 
progressive income taxes are adopted, if Ii > I;, then 1'i > 1';. Otherwise, 
1'i < 1';. When regressive income taxes are adopted, if Ii > I;, then 1'i < 1';. 
Otherwise, 1'i > 1';. Q.E.D. 
In general, a tax alternative is preferred by voters if less tax is paid to 
the government. As a result, the utility difference between the median voter 
for both trade tax policy and income tax policy depends on the income tax 
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payment, which is determined by the income and the income tax rate. When 
the income of the median voter is higher than the income of the pivotal voter, 
if progressive income taxes are adopted, then trade taxes are preferred. If 
regressive income taxes are adopted, then income taxes are supported through 
majority voting. Similarly, when the income of the median voter is lower than 
income of the pivotal voter, if progressive income taxes are adopted, then 
income taxes are preferred. If regressive income taxes are adopted, then trade 
taxes are supported through majority voting. 
When the economy of a country is developed, assume that the income of 
the median income voter increases from 1~ to 1~ and the income of the pivotal 
voter changes from It to 1;2. Which taxation policy alternative is preferred 
through majority voting depends on the income tax rate. As a result, if the 
income tax method is known, the choice of tax alternatives for different stages 
of economic development depends on the relative positions of the median voter 
and the pivotal voter in the income distribution. 
Corollary 2: When the domestic country adopts progressive income taxes for 
diHerent stages of economic development, there are four possible cases. 
(l)Ifl~ > I~l and 1~ > I~2 trade taxes are preferred by most people for both t J t J' 
stages of economic development. 
(2) If I~ < I~l and 1~ < I~2 income taxes are preferred by most people for t J t J' 
both stages of economic development. 
(3) If 1~ > 1;1 and 1~ < 1;2, Erst trade taxes and then income taxes are 
supported through majority voting. 
142 
(4) If 1~ < 1;1 and 1; > 1;2, first income taxes and tben trade taxes are 
supported tbrougb majority voting. 
When income taxes are progressive, if the income of the median voter is 
higher than the income of the pivotal voter, the individual income tax rate of 
the median voter is higher than the individual income tax rate of the pivotal 
voter. Therefore, trade tax policy yields higher utility for both stages of eco-
nomic development. If the income of the median voter is lower than the income 
of the pivotal voter, the individual income tax rate of the median voter is lower 
than the individual income tax rate of the pivotal voter. Therefore, income 
tax policy yields higher utility for both stages of economic development. Sim-
ilar ly, if the income of the median voter is first larger and then smaller than 
the income of the pivotal voter for different stages of economic development, 
first trade tax policy and then income tax policy is supported. If the income of 
the median voter is first lower and then higher than the income of the pivotal 
voter for two stages of economic development, first income tax policy and then 
trade tax policy is supported. 
Corollary 3: When tbe domestic country adopts regressive income taxes for 
different stages of economic development, tbere are four possible cases. 
(l)If 1~ > r+:1 and 1~ > 1,,:2 income taxes are preferred by most people for t J t J' 
botb stages of economic development. 
(2) If 1~ < 1;1 and 1; < 1;2, trade taxes are preferred by most people for 
botb stages of economic development. 
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(3) If 1~ > 1;1 and 1~ < Ir, first income taxes and then trade taxes are 
supported through majority voting. 
(4) If 1~ < 1;1 and 1~ > 1;2, first trade taxes and then income taxes are 
supported through majority voting. 
Corollary 4: ""'-hen the government adopts progressive income taxes first and 
then switch to regressive income taxes, there are four possible cases. 
-1 1 -2 (l)If Ii > I; and Ii > 1;2, first trade taxes and then income taxes are 
supported through majority voting. 
-1 -2 2 (2) If Ii < 1;1 and Ii < I; , first income taxes and then trade taxes are 
supported through majority voting. 
(3) If I~ > 1;1 and 1~ < 1;2, trade taxes are preferred by most voters for both 
stages of economic development. 
(4) If 1~ < J',:1 and 1~ > 1*2 income taxes are preferred by most voters for t J t J' 
both stages of economic development. 
Corollary 5: ""'-hen the government adopts regressive income taxes first and 
then switch to progressive income taxes, there are four possible cases. 
(l)If 1~ > I~l and 1~ > I~2. first income taxes and then trade taxes are t J t J ' 
supported through majority voting. 
(2) If I~ < I~l and 1~ < I~2 first trade taxes and then income taxes are t J t J ' 
supported through majority voting. 
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-1 2 (3) If Ii > 1;1 and Ii < 1;2, income taxes are preferred by most people for 
both stages of economic development. 
(4) If I~ < 1;1 and I~ > 1;2, trade taxes are preferred by most people for 
both stages of economic development. 
Using the same reasoning as above, the choice between tax alternatives 
depends on the relative levels of income for the median voter and the pivotal 
voter. For any stage of economic development, when progressive income taxes 
are adopted, if the income of the median voter is higher than the income of the 
pivotal voter, trade taxes are adopted. If the income of the median voter is 
lower than the income of the pivotal voter, income taxes are adopted. Similarly, 
when regressive income taxes are adopted, if the income of the median voter is 
higher than the income of the pivotal voter, income taxes are adopted. If the 
income of the median voter is higher than the income of the pivotal voter, trade 
taxes are adopted. As a result, if the relative positions of the median voter 
and the pivotal voter in the incOlne distribution and the type of tax method 
are known, the relative levels of income tax rates for the pivotal voter and the 
median voter can also be derived. Therefore, the outcome of majority voting 
between income taxes and trade taxes for two stages of economic development 
can be obtained. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed a political economy explanation for the issue 
concerning the choice among taxation alternatives. The existing explanation 
does not illustrate why trade taxes instead of more efficient income taxes are 
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adopted as a taxation policy for many countries in the policy-making process 
and why the taxation choice might change through economic development. In 
this chapter we show how different taxation policies are supported through 
majority voting in a democratic political system. In general, voters prefer 
to pay lower taxes to the domestic government and therefore the outcome of 
majority voting on taxation policy relies on the tax methods and the relative 
position s of the median voter and the pivotal voter in the income distribution. 
If the income tax of the median voter is higher than the income tax of the 
pivotal voter, trade taxes are more likely preferred. Otherwise, income taxes 
are preferred. When the econOlny of a country is developed, it is possible 
that the country will adopt trade taxes in the early stage of its economic 
development, and will then adopt income taxes in the later stage of economic 
development. If Cobb-Douglas utility is used, the taxation choice depends on 
the income tax rate. All possible cases which links the income tax method and 
the economic development are also discussed. 
Since politicians care about the response of voters in a democratic society, 
a policy supported by the majority of voters is adopted. By using this political 
economic reasoning, the choice among taxation policy alternative is explained. 
Nevertheless, majority voting is seldom used for trade policy issues in practice. 
In addition the individual's indirect utility is assumed to take the Gorman , 
form because it is the most general function that can be used to achieve an 
aggregation of representative individuals. Since the focus is on the relationship 
between the income level and voting choice, all individuals are assumed to have 
identical preferences. If individuals have different preferences, the reasoning 
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is still valid. However, it is difficult to reach specific conclusions since the 
relative positions of the median voter and the pivotal voter are difficult to 
calculate. In addition, the assumption of a balanced budget is also made so 
that aggregate income taxes and trade taxes should be equivalent. In fact, the 
government budget is seldom balanced and the level of government spending 
is also determined in the political process. How the government decides the 
level of government spending and achieves the goal of budgetary balance in the 
political process may be undertaken in future research. Finally, cross-country 
empirical research about the choice between tariffs and income taxes might be 
conducted in order to test the hypothesis obtained in this chapter. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
The political economy of trade policy is an important and controversial 
topic in the international trade field. In order to produce better policy, an 
understanding of the policy-making process is needed. The purpose of this 
research is to see how politics can influence trade policy formulation. Four 
papers are presented in this thesis which concerns two major issues of trade 
policy-making: strategic lobbying and the choice among taxation methods. 
In order to understand how export subsidies are influenced by lobbying 
activities in the policy-making process, a lobbying-influence model, based on a 
two-stage game framework, is built in chapter 3. Not only can government set 
a subsidy in order to maximize the social welfare as suggested in the strategic 
trade policy literature, but also firms themselves can organize interest groups 
through lobbying activities in order to promote their special interests. Since 
both the welfare-maximizing model of strategic trade policy and the lobbying-
influence model of political economy are based on the same methodology of 
game theory, a comparison between these two models is provided. The results 
suggest that the domestic firm will offer a greater lobbying contribution if 
the market demand and the lobbying influence parameter are higher, and the 
marginal costs of the domestic firm are lower. When the lobbying influence 
parameter is zero, the lobbying subsidies obtained by the domestic firm are 
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always zero, irrespective of the lobbying contribution offered by the domestic 
firm. Therefore, the domestic firm would not engage in lobbying acti,"ities 
because no benefits can be obtained. In addition, if export subsidies are de-
termined by the level of lobbying contribution, some testable hypothesis are 
available as follows: (1) The more efficient industries will offer more lobbying 
contribution in order to get higher subsidies. (2) The industries have higher 
incentive to engage in lobbying activities if the market demand is larger. (3) 
The relationship between the lobbying influence parameter and the export 
subsidies is positive. 
It is quite clear that export subsidies can shift the profits of the domestic 
firm, and that the domestic firm will engage in lobbying activities only if its 
profits are increased. Therefore, the profits of the domestic firm lmder both 
the welfare-maximizing and lobbying-influencing models are higher than the 
profits of the domestic firm under a free trade policy. The domestic firms 
always have an incentive to engage in lobbying activities. However, lobbying 
activities are a kind of rent-seeking behaviour, the lobbying contributions are 
a dead weight loss. That is to say, the social welfare under both the welfare-
maximizing model and a free trade policy are higher than the social welfare 
lmder the lobbying-influence model. The strategic trade argument, that a 
subsidy policy can increase social welfare in a duopoly market, does not hold 
in the lobbying-influencing model. 
In contrast with strategic trade policy, export subsidies are assumed to 
be determined by the level of lobbying contribution in the lobbying-influence 
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model. As a result, governments are quite passive and only the demand side of 
trade policy-making is incorporated. In other words, the lobbying-influencing 
model fails to consider the supply side of trade policy-making and onl:y uses 
the lobbying influence parameter to express the response of a government. For 
simplicity, the lobbying-subsidy function s(l) = kl 1/ 2 is assumed in the model. 
The relationship between export subsidy and lobbying contribution should 
satisfy the following properties: (1) the higher the lobbying contribution, the 
higher the export subsidies, (2) the marginal return of lobbying activities is 
decreasing. As a matter of fact, the lobbying influencing parameter and the 
functional form depend upon the type of political system. In other words, 
even if the lobbying contribution is the same, the export subsidies obtained 
by interest groups still vary for different types of political system. We need to 
understand more about the link between the lobbying influence parameter and 
the functional form with the type of political system. More work specifying 
the institutional setting, combining both the supply and demand sides of trade 
policy-making, should be undertaken in order to produce a more complete 
picture on the trade policy-making. 
Chapter 4 investigates the issue of the determinants of asymmetric lob-
bying. The results suggest that the incentive of the domestic firm to engage 
in lobbying activities varies with its marginal costs in both the complete and 
incomplete information cases. The domestic firm spends more money on lob-
bying activities if it is more cost competitive. That is why different levels of 
protection subsidies are obtained by the domestic firm with different marginal 
costs. When information over cost competitiveness is incomplete, both the 
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pooling equilibrium and the separating equilibrium can be found, but only the 
separating equilibrium is self-enforcing. At the separating equilibrium, if cost 
competitiveness is of the high type, the domestic firm offers zero lobbying con-
tribution. If cost competitiveness is of the low type, the domestic firm offers a 
positive lobbying contribution, which is higher than the full information case 
in order to reveal its private information. Signalling is costly. As a result, the 
profits of the domestic firnl under the separating equilibrium are lower than 
those under the full information case. In addition, since the social welfare of 
the domestic country is equal to the profits of the domestic firm in the export 
subsidy case, the level of social welfare under the separating equilibrium is 
also lower. A new explanation is provided of how the external environment 
influences the incentives of an interest group to engage in lobbying activities, 
and therefore why the lobbying outcomes are different. 
Not only the cost competitiveness but also the level of market demand and 
the lobbying influence parameter can influence the incentives of the domestic 
firm to engage in lobbying activities. When the information over these vari-
ables are incomplete, more work may be done in order to get a complete picture 
of how external environment determines asymmetric lobbying. In addition, the 
assumption made on the nature of competition can also be extended. First 
of all, if firms are assumed to compete in Bertrand rather than in Cournot 
duopoly, future research can follow Ireland (1993) to examine how private 
information can be revealed through lobbying activities. Secondly, competi-
tion among interest groups can also influence the results of lobbying activities 
(Becker 1983, 1985). Therefore, future research can also examine the effects of 
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cost competitiveness on asymmetric lobbying when both the domestic and for-
eign firms also compete in providing lobbying contribution in order to influence 
the level of subsidy. 
Chapter 5 investigates the issue of the positive role of lobbying actiyities 
in an incomplete information setting when potential foreign entry is consid-
ered. The results suggest that both the separating and pooling equilibria exist. 
When the expected profits of entering the market are negative, the foreign firm 
will stay outside the market. The domestic firm of both types offers zero lob-
bying contribution, which is the same as in the full information case. The 
pooling equilibrium is the refined equilibrium. When the expected profits of 
entering the market are positive, the foreign firm might enter the market. At 
the same time, the separating equilibrium is the refined equilibrium. The do-
mestic firm offers a zero lobbying contribution if its cost competitiveness is of 
the high type; and it offers a positive lobbying contribution if its cost compet-
itiveness is of the low type. Nevertheless, signalling is costly. The profits of 
the domestic firm under the separating equilibrium are lower than those under 
the pooling equilibrium. In addition, social welfare under the separating equi-
librium is also lower than social welfare under the pooling equilibrium. When 
the domestic firm engages in lobbying activities and reveals its private infor-
mation, social welfare still decreases. No positive role for lobbying activities 
is found in the incomplete information case when potential entry of a foreign 
firm is incorporated into the model. Lobbying activities should be banned by 
the government. In the public choice literature, Rasmusen (1993), Lohmann 
(1995) and Largerlof (1997) have showed that there is a positive role for lobby-
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ing activities when the information is incomplete. However, these models do 
not consider the possibility of potential entry. When international competition 
is considered, the actual and potential threats of foreign firms are important 
for trade policy-making. 
Nevertheless, the results suggested in this chapter are not robust and rely 
on the content of social welfare. Since both the domestic and foreign firms 
are assumed to compete in the third market, the social welfare of the domes-
tic country is equal to the profits of the domestic firm. If the profits of the 
domestic firm under the pooling equilibrium are higher than those under the 
separating equilibrium, social welfare decreases when lobbying activities occur. 
However, if firms are assumed to compete in the domestic market, the social 
welfare of the domestic country is equal to the sum of the consumer surplus 
and producer surplus. In this case, when lobbying activities occur, the change 
of social welfare is uncertain and depends on specific conditions. Lobbying 
activities might still have a positive role even if the potential foreign entry is 
incorporated. In addition, since there is no foreign firm in the market in the 
first period, when the domestic firm engages in lobbying, no export subsidies 
are actually obtained. The lobbying contribution only serves the purpose of 
signalling. If some foreign firms are in the market in the first period, lobbying 
subsidies can shift the profits of the domestic firm in the first period and there-
fore the social welfare is likely to increase as well. Therefore, more research 
should be conducted in order to see how different settings affect the impact of 
lobbying activities on the change of social welfare. 
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One of the key problems in the strategic trade policy literature is that of 
how the government can obtain private information in order to set their trade 
policy. In chapter 4 and 5, we know that lobbying contribution can ,,'ork 
as a signal to reveal private information in the lobbying-influencing model. 
Consequently, lobbying activities might also provide information in the welfare-
maximizing model and therefore help the government to make the right policy 
when information about the industry is incomplete. Some market variables 
such as outputs have been widely used as a revealing mechanism in the strategic 
trade policy literature. However, there is no distortion of the product market 
when lobbying contribution is used. As a result, lobbying contribution might 
be a better signalling method in the welfare-maximizing models, and more 
representative of the real world, than the other mechanisms. In addition, the 
functions of lobbying contributions have not been settled in the literature. 
On the one hand, lobbying contributions are used to influence outcomes of 
a policy (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Politicians are willing to serve an 
interest group's wish, and to deviate from a policy position of public interest. 
On the other hand, lobbying contributions are intended to increase the elected 
probability of a preferred party. Interest groups can support a party if its 
policy position is more favorable (Magee, Brock and Young, 1989), or if it acts 
as the agent on the principal's behalf (Hall and Wayman, 1990). More work 
might be conducted to understand different roles of lobbying activities in the 
policy-making process. 
Chapter 6 investigates the issue of why different taxation policies are adopted 
according to the stage of a country's economic development. Assume that in 
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a democratic society, individuals can vote for their preferred taxes, and that a 
policy which yields the highest utility is adopted by the government. Suppose 
that the preferences of all individuals take the Gorman form. We show why 
trade taxes rather than more efficient income taxes is supported through ma-
jority voting even if taxes are revenue equivalent. The results suggest that the 
choice between trade taxes and income taxes depends on the level of income 
taxes, which are determined by the income tax methods, the relative income 
level between the median and pivotal voters in the income distribution, and 
the movement of income distribution over time. In addition, an example of 
the Cobb-Douglas utility function, which is a special case of the Gorman form, 
is discussed. When progressive income taxes are adopted, if the income tax 
rate of the median voter is higher than that of the pivotal voter, trade taxes 
are more likely to be chosen. Otherwise, income taxes are preferred. Simi-
larly, when regressive income taxes are adopted, if the income tax rate of the 
median voter is higher than that of the pivotal voter, income taxes are more 
likely to be chosen. Otherwise, trade taxes are preferred. Therefore, it is pos-
sible that the domestic country will adopt trade taxes in the early stage of 
its economic development, and will then adopt income taxes when it becomes 
rich. It should be pointed out that the current literature neglects the following 
political economy issues: (1) How a taxation policy is politically accepted as 
a source of tax revenue. (2) The nature of the political economy relationship 
between different tax instruments and economic development. A new political 
economy explanation of the choice among taxation methods is provided in this 
chapter. 
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Although politics do have an impact on economic policy-making, the ma-
jority voting is seldom used for trade policy issue in practice. Nevertheless, 
this analysis provides political economy reasoning explaining the choice among 
policy alternatives. The choice among policy alternatives is an important topic 
from a political economy of trade policy point of view. On the one hand, fu-
ture work should try to specify the mechanism which governs the choice of 
one policy over another in the policy-making process. For example, the role of 
legislative organization in the policy formulation. On the other hand, cross-
country empirical research about the choice between tariffs and income taxes 
might also be conducted. Furthermore, many issues around this policy choice 
approach might be pursued in future research. For example, many developing 
countries try to liberalize their trade policy. Should they switch from tar-
iffs policy to a free trade policy? Or should they give up import-substitution 
policies for export-expansion policies? In addition, the speed of trade liber-
alization is also important. Should the government remove trade protection 
immediately or should do it gradually (Falvey, 1994 ; Falvey and Kim, 1992)? 
All issues should not only consider economic dimension but also needs to in-
clude political considerations. Perhaps more attention to trade policy-making 
using a political economy analysis can reduce the gap between the suggestions 
of economists and the practice of trade policy. 
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